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 Issues that arise between Muslims and Jews around the world are often, today, 
linked automatically to the political divide between Arabs and Jews in Israel and 
Palestine. In 20th and 21st century Morocco, tensions between Muslims and Jews have 
surely escalated along climbing intensity in Israel-Palestine; however, attempting to 
directly correlate Jewish-Muslim relations in Morocco to dynamics in Israel-Palestine 
would undermine the far-reaching role that various historical factors in Morocco have 
had in impacting relations between the two groups. This thesis examines some of the 
most influential governmental policies in Morocco, looking primarily at pre-
Protectorate policies under the Muslim sultans and at French policies during the 
Protectorate era. Looking at how these policies have historically influenced, and often 
reduced, the degree of accommodation between the Muslim and Jewish communities in 
Morocco, this paper then explores the effectiveness of various movements in present-
day Morocco that seek to counter the harmful legacies of these policies.  
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Introduction 
A carrefour in the geographic, cultural, and economic senses, Morocco stands in 
a unique position in the international context, linking Africa, the Middle East, and 
Europe in several ways. The country is unique due to the historical presence of a large 
Jewish population in the region that over the years became a Muslim-majority Islamic 
kingdom. This kingdom’s location along the Mediterranean coast made it, during the 
age of colonialism, a strategic economic locus for European powers, particularly for 
France. However, the French presence and policies there before and during the 
Protectorate era1 significantly disrupted intergroup dynamics, both intentionally and 
inadvertently, leaving a mark that remained long after the French government presence 
departed.  
Before – and though to a lesser degree, while – these external influences 
manifested in Morocco, members of Morocco’s Muslim and Jewish communities 
coexisted for centuries, albeit with minor hurdles. However, significant internal and 
external forces, such as the French Protectorate throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, 
allowed for widespread feelings of distrust to develop between Jewish and Muslim 
communities in Morocco. These feelings were exacerbated by political dynamics 
around the world during the 20th century, and eventually led to the rapid departure of 
Jews from Morocco. This emigration has caused a profound lack of awareness among 
young Moroccan Muslims regarding the historical importance of the Moroccan Jewish 
                                                        
1 The Protectorate-era in Morocco refers to the period of time when Morocco was an 
official French “protectorate”, similar to an overseas colony. The French protectorate in 
Morocco officially began in 1912 and ended in 1956, but the soft power of the French 
government had begun influencing Moroccan economic and political dynamics by the 
end of the 18th century.  
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community and its impact on present-day Moroccan society. Today, Moroccan religious 
identities have become more politically charged than they have ever been before, as 
these historical factors have culminated and resulted in the formation of national 
identities. With so few remaining in the country, “Jews” often becomes synonymous 
with “Israelis,” and as a result, relations between Moroccans supporting Palestine and 
their Jewish compatriots are thought to be characteristically tense.  
Despite the pockets of political chaos and rough relations between Muslims and 
Jews in Morocco over the centuries, and the sporadic periods of instability between the 
communities today, there are still a number of Moroccans–Muslims and Jews–who 
hope for peaceful relations to once again become more widespread. However, during a 
time when efforts to encourage mutual understanding bring with them the risk of 
political categorization, stigmatization and silence, those who lead such efforts must be 
deliberate in their tactics to facilitate understanding between the two communities.  
In this thesis, I attempt to answer the following questions:  
1. How did Moroccan and French policies that targeted its Morocco’s Jewish 
population impact general relations between the Muslim and Jewish 
communities there over the years? 
2. How did such policies play into the rapid emigration of Jews from Morocco, as 
seen in the latter half of the 20th century? 
3. How do leaders of civil society movements in present-day Morocco seek to 
counter the harmful consequences emigration had on Moroccan society?  
In this thesis, I argue that the history of inter-group relations in Morocco, 
specifically between the Muslim and Jewish communities, has been shaped directly by 
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sultan-era and colonial policies; the legacy of these policies has created divisions in 
Moroccan society that have persisted under the surface, and that are now deep enough 
to allow dynamics associated with the conflict in Israel and Palestine to penetrate. 
However, despite such divisions, Moroccan society holds in its collective memory the 
contributions of Moroccan Jews to Moroccan culture and history, and some Moroccans 
today have begun the effort to correct the recent history that has erased Jews from the 
Moroccan landscape.  
To begin answering my research questions, I collected material related to my 
research question through academic literature, written and oral primary sources, and 
interviews with individuals involved in efforts to either preserve Jewish culture in 
Morocco, or to consciously engage Muslims and Jews in dialogue and collaboration. 
My written sources come primarily from academic journals, news sources, and 
published government documents; together, they draw a fuller – but still limited – 
picture of the impact government policies had on Muslim-Jewish relations in Morocco. 
While I was living in Morocco in the fall of 2015, and collecting primary source 
material related to this project, Ms. Vanessa Paloma Elbaz generously allowed me 
access to an array of oral primary sources to use in my research. Ms. Paloma Elbaz is 
the director of KHOYA: les archives sonores du Maroc juif in Casablanca, and the 
recordings that I used are part of the oral history archive of Jewish life in Morocco that 
she is developing.  
The interviews I conducted independently mainly took place between November 
and December 2015 in Casablanca, Rabat, and the Al Haouz province of Morocco. The 
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interviews in Al Haouz province took place in Marrakech and Tameslouht in particular. 
All interviews took place in either French or English.  
The written literature and primary documents used in this thesis provided 
essential context, background, and factual information regarding the various 
complicated aspects of Muslim-Jewish relations in Morocco. Complementing the 
written sources, the oral recordings available through KHOYA: les archives sonores du 
Maroc juif and the interviews with Moroccans leading present-day civil society efforts 
brought to light individual experiences and nuances that in written accounts are often 
engulfed and overshadowed by broad trends. By synthesizing historical and 
contemporary sources, I drew connections between the history of Jews under the sultans 
and the French government in Morocco, the impact the policies of these governments 
had on evolving relations between Moroccan Jews and Moroccan Muslims, and the 
objectives behind modern movements to preserve Jewish culture and re-establish 
understanding between Muslims and Jews. 
I chose a qualitative method in collecting primary material for my research 
question, as most of the information I gathered would be based on individuals’ 
experiences and goals, which I could not hope to uncover through a series of strictly 
structured or data-based questions. Additionally, the flexible qualitative method I 
followed allowed the conversations I had with informants to take multiple directions, 
which allowed me to better define terms and concepts. When I began answering the 
third question I pose in this project, I had hoped to examine methods of peace-building 
between Jews and Muslims in Morocco, despite the fact that I was yet unable to fully 
define what the term entailed in this context, where tensions were present but had not 
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erupted into any sort of widespread violent conflict. Through speaking with my 
interviewees, I was able to learn about the creative ways in which peace-building is 
directly and indirectly approached and perceived. Allowing informants to speak freely 
about their experiences, without being confined by a series of specific questions, also 
enabled me to learn about some of their perceptions of evolving Jewish identity in 
Moroccan society. 
In order to document the information shared during each interview, I handwrote 
notes, and sometimes asked participants if they would be willing to let me record the 
interview. I wanted participants to feel comfortable sharing the relevant information 
with me, and therefore, depending on the subject the interview focused on, I chose not 
to record some of the interviews. The situation differed for each participant and 
depended on the content of the interview, and the interviewee’s preference. In addition, 
the institution in Morocco that I began this project under provided consent forms for 
participants.2 Mainly using the French versions of these forms, I obtained the consent of 
my interviewees before including their thoughts in my paper.      
While each interviewee had a unique perspective on an angle of my research 
question, I divided the interviews I conducted into three main categories for the 
purposes of this study. Although several of the interviews could have been placed in 
multiple categories, I chose the groupings based on each interviewee’s area of greatest 
expertise and the subject she or he expanded upon the most. The interview categories 
are:  
                                                        
2 See Appendix A for a copy of the consent form.  
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1. Personal and academic accounts of the history of Jewish-Muslim relations in 
Morocco, Jewish culture in Morocco, and the conditions that led up to the rapid 
departure of Moroccan Jews from the country.  
2. The methods by which relations between Jews and Muslims in Morocco can be 
ameliorated in the future.  
3. The activities and intent of organizations that facilitate dialogue, cooperation 
and intercultural understanding between Muslims and Jews in Morocco. 
As stated, the majority of these interviews took place over a four-week period. 
Due to this limited amount of time, I confined my interviews to certain cities with 
historically large Jewish populations, despite the fact that there are efforts facilitating 
dialogue in other parts of the country. I also spoke mainly to leaders of the 
organizations I describe in my paper, and did not speak to many participants in the 
movements themselves. For instance, I did not speak to parents of students enrolled in 
intercultural schools, nor did I speak to the communities who would directly benefit 
from the agricultural projects I will later discuss. This limitation was both due to the 
time I had to establish connections and conduct interviews, and also due to the fact that 
I was unsure of how willing community members would be to engage in overt dialogue 
about the subject I am researching. While it is important to include these voices, I also 
think it is necessary to do so when there is more time available to explain the objectives 
of the research and build trust between the researcher and participants, particularly as I 
am pursuing a topic that is sensitive to many people.  
I approached this project with a deep interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
the effects it might have on Moroccan society, peace-building efforts within 
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communities in conflict, and cooperation across socially and politically constructed 
boundaries. For these reasons, I began this project with the intent to focus on what I 
thought were the peripheral effects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Morocco. Over 
the course of the project, however, it became clear that tensions between the Muslim 
and Jewish communities in Morocco have much deeper roots, and for the most part, 
have been unrelated, until recently, to events in Israel and Palestine. Relations between 
the groups in Morocco, have rather been carefully constructed by the Moroccan 
government and by the colonial French government through policy, and the added strain 
caused by events in the Middle East only serves to exacerbate tensions that were put 
into motion by these internal Moroccan policies.  
In its broadest sense, this thesis is an example of the impacts policy has in 
shaping the relationship between minorities and a majority population. In understanding 
how minorities fit into a society in which they are “othered,” it is important to first 
understand how government policy allows for and may encourage the “othering” of 
certain groups. The Moroccan case clearly exemplifies how society’s views can often 
mirror governmental actions. 
The movements and organizations that are described toward the end of this 
thesis are examples of slow-moving, but successful, efforts to counter historical 
narratives that “othered” the Jewish minority in Morocco. While Morocco’s history and 
the evolution of intergroup relations there are unique, aspects of such movements as 
these can be integrated and adjusted in other societies that seek to negotiate and 
equalize the rights of minorities in relation to a dominant majority.  
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In the context of Moroccan society, the themes this thesis explores have more 
specific significance. Throughout the twentieth century, and particularly after the 
Second World War, Morocco saw its once significant population of Jews emigrate in 
large numbers–mainly to Israel, France, and North America–at an much more rapid rate 
than before, due to various factors. As a result of this emigration, children growing up 
in Morocco today are not aware of the fact that a significant number of Jews in Israel 
and around the world still consider themselves Moroccan by heritage, culture, and 
perhaps birth. Furthermore, and maybe more importantly, many Moroccan Muslim 
youth are not aware of the fact that there are still Moroccan Jewish communities in 
Morocco, simply because many of the youth have never met a Jew, due to their 
diminishing numbers in Morocco. As a result, unlike their grandparents, most Moroccan 
Muslim children today have not had the chance to grow up in a society in which they 
can see Jews and Muslims living side-by-side as they did before.3 With this young 
generation, the word “Jew” is sometimes automatically dissociated from Moroccan 
identity. Rather, it has become synonymous with the word “Israeli,” and in turn, 
“Israel” is associated with conflict.  
This reality demonstrates the significant consequences Jewish emigration from 
Morocco has on Morocco as a whole – it has drastically changed the historical narrative 
of culture and identity in what was once a pluralistic and religiously diverse society. In 
order to counter these consequences and to bring about a renewed acceptance of Jews as 
true members of Moroccan society, it is essential to bring about an awareness, 
particularly among Moroccan youth, of the history of Judaism in Morocco, the                                                         
3Interview with Jacky Kadoch, Synagogue Beth-El, Marrakech, Morocco. Conducted 
by Namratha Somayajula, 27 November 2015.  
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preservation of Jewish culture in Morocco and the ability of Jews in Morocco to be just 
as Moroccan as their Muslim neighbors. Such awareness could not only impact the Jews 
who remain in Morocco, but could also allow Moroccan Muslim youth to better 
understand the complicated evolution of their own history and identity, which until 
recently was closely intertwined with Moroccan Jewish narratives.  
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The Construction of Conflict and Cooperation 
Several secondary sources speak to the historical relations between Muslims and 
Jews in Morocco, and draw a detailed timeline of the events that led to emigration and 
present-day relations. There is relatively little research that focuses specifically on the 
ongoing dialogue and cooperation among Moroccan Muslims and Jews, amidst the 
tensions that have penetrated the social fabric in the last century. The secondary 
literature discussed here, however, addresses a variety of sub-themes concerning 
Moroccan Jewish experiences and contextualizes them within broader societal 
dynamics.  
André Levy’s piece, titled Playing for Control of Distance: Card Games 
Between Jews and Muslims on a Casablancan Beach speaks to the “isolationist 
tendencies” of Moroccan Jews as a minority group, highlighting the increasing 
emergence of cultural enclaves as the Jewish population overall declines. He 
acknowledges that, while his “data indicate isolation and identification with France and 
Israel as primary responses to this foreseen dissolution, this tiny and diminishing 
community cannot be self-sufficient.”4 Focusing on this fact, he presents an issue 
relevant to most minority groups: while Moroccan Jews seek to preserve their identity 
through isolated cultural enclaves, it is necessary, in Moroccan society, for the Jewish 
minority and the Muslim majority to interact. His analysis particularizes the “dance of 
any minority anywhere,” including the Judeo-Spanish and Judeo-Moroccan groups who 
sought to “protect the integrity of [their] group towards the next generation.” He 
addresses the question: how does one accept the surrounding culture, and embrace                                                         
4 André Levy, “Playing for Control of Distance: Card Games Between Jews and 
Muslims on a Casablancan Beach,” (Israel: Ben Gurion Univeristy: 1999). 
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it…and at the same time not meld with it?5 He says that the basic solution he has seen is 
for “Jews to contain their relations in well-defined spaces and within clear social frames 
over which they aspire to hold some control.”6 While Levy speaks mainly about 
physical spaces, these frames can indicate intangible spaces as well, such as the poetry 
and music through which Judeo-Moroccan women passed their cultural values on to the 
younger generation in the private sphere.7   
 While conducting his fieldwork, Levy observes the interactions between Jews 
and Muslims on a beach in Casablanca. He observes the ways in which each group 
interacts with the other over card games, establishing unspoken rules that in turn seem 
to break down barriers, allowing each group to establish control to an extent, and 
diminish stereotypes. In these card games, Jews and Muslims form mixed couples when 
playing against another couple–Levy cites an interview with one of the players, who 
says that this is done on purpose, to avoid accusations along “ethnic” or religious lines. 
While this “mingling of couples,” as he calls it, seems like a way to break down barriers 
between Jews and Muslims in Morocco, it comes primarily from a wish to avoid 
preventable conflict and in this case “is an indication of deep social division outside the 
game.”8 His paper provides important historical context, and also provides a unique 
example of an effort that seeks to maintain friendly relations by deliberately 
constructing societal roles. The way in which these card games are structured–and the 
fact that they are so well-established on that particular beach–suggests that the players                                                         
5 Interview with Vanessa Paloma Elbaz, office of KHOYA: les archives sonores du 
Maroc juif, Casablanca, Morocco. Conducted by Namratha Somayajula, 2 December 
2015. 
6 Levy, “Playing for Control of Distance,” 1999. 
7 Interview with Vanessa Paloma Elbaz, 2 December 2015. 
8 Levy, “Playing for Control of Distance,” 1999. 
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share a desire to carry on with normal activities in cooperation with the “other,” without 
barriers across cultural and political lines.  
Mapping Dialogue Between Jewish and Muslim Communities in Europe by Ruth 
Friedman identifies and explains the activities of institutions in five European countries 
that organize intercultural activities between Muslim and Jewish communities in each 
country. Friedman notes that such activities– such as the creation of a Jewish-Moroccan 
Muslim football tournament in an Amsterdam neighborhood– are relatively simple, as 
they are small-scale and require no national or international fundraising; however, due 
to the simplicity and small scale, such projects also remain largely unknown outside of 
their immediate target population. “The reality,” Friedman explains, “is that for some 
years dialogue has been going on quietly at the local level but ideas and practices are 
rarely shared.”9 Activists in Morocco share this notion as well. Despite the efforts of 
numerous small organizations that attempt to build bridges on individual levels, and the 
fact that there are many people and organizations putting their energy into intercultural 
efforts, “nothing will be done…if we don’t have the synergy between these 
initiatives.”10 
Acknowledging the importance of the identities of “Arab Jews” in post-Zionist 
discourse and current politics, Emily Gottreich (2008) argues that the simplified concept 
of the “Arab Jew” implies a “particular politics of knowledge vis-à-vis the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict” and that, along with two other main factors, works to flatten and 
keep ambiguous the identity of the Arab Jew. She notes that in some circles, “the                                                         9 Ruth Friedman, “Mapping Dialogue Between Jewish and Muslim Communities in 
Europe,” (USA: Berghahn Books: 2008). 
10 Interview with El-Mehdi Boudra, Rabat. Conducted by Namratha Somayajula, 1 
December 2015. 
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concept of the Arab Jew almost always implies a specific politics…more broadly, the 
idea of the Arab Jew emerged as a corrective to the…division created by Zionism on 
the one hand and Arab nationalism on the other, which together conspired to make the 
term ‘Arab Jew’ seem an oxymoron, or even, to some, a provocation.” Through an 
analysis of the perceived mutual exclusivity of the two terms–Arab and Jew–that come 
together to describe this group of people, Gottreich exposes the historical dynamics that 
shaped experiences of North African Jews. In turn, she effectively starts to counter the 
assumptions that are made about this group based on the terminology that describes 
them, and thus effectively starts to steer readers away from generalizations.  
 Though the specific issue of language is only briefly touched upon in this paper, 
Rajuan and Bekerman (2011) offer, through a discussion of language, unique 
perspectives on cultural identity, national identity, and coexistence. The goal of the 
bilingual Palestinian-Jewish schools studied by Rajuan and Bekerman (2011) is “to 
raise youth who both acknowledge and respect one another…[and] at the same time 
retain loyalty to their own ethnic/cultural heritages and identities.” 11This goal and the 
structure of the schools simply exemplify the capacity for both mutual understanding 
and cultural retention among communities between which broader political tensions 
may exist. Clearly, there are several differences between the structures of the schools 
that Rajuan and Bekerman studied and the Jewish schools in Morocco that are attended 
by both Jewish and Muslim students. However, the authors, who studied the bilingual 
schools in Israel, managed to portray “the significance of bilingualism and its inter-
                                                        
11 Maureen Rajuan & Zvi Bekerman, “Teachers' ‘inside’ reports on language instruction 
in the Palestinian–Jewish Schools in Israel,” (Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural 
Development, 2011), 465. 
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connectedness to almost every aspect of school life” through an analysis of teachers’ 
final reports for an in-service.12  
As Rajuan and Bekerman explain, very few teachers who participated in the in-
service chose to focus explicitly on bilingualism within their reports. Instead, the 
authors found through analyzing the reports that the theme of national identity versus 
coexistence was the most prevalent. If the term “nation” is perceived in terms of 
cultural groups rather than state entities, then this theme is relevant to bilingual 
education in Morocco as well. The use of the majority group’s language–Hebrew in 
Israel and Arabic in Morocco–in theory indirectly influences the power dynamic 
between members of each language group. Particularly in the Jewish schools started by 
l’Alliance Israélite Universelle, however, this dynamic is altered with the presence of a 
third language, French, in which the bulk of conversations–especially those between 
Jewish and Muslim students–take place.13  
In the Arab nationalist movement, which will be discussed later within the 
Moroccan context, common use of the Arabic language was one of the main criteria 
used in establishing a cohesive Arab identity and in that case served as a tool for 
alienation rather than cultural understanding. These days, youth in Morocco are also 
usually the most lacking in cultural awareness as social diversity rapidly declines. Many 
Moroccan Muslim children have not had the same chance as their parents and 
grandparents to grow up in a Moroccan society in which Jews and Muslims interacted 
                                                        
12 Rajuan and Bekerman, “Teachers’ ‘inside’ reports,” 465.  
13 Interview with Shimon Cohen, École Maïmonide, Casablanca, Morocco. Conducted 
by Namratha Somayajula, 25 November 2015. 
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naturally on a daily basis.14 Because “deep acquaintance with the culture and traditions 
of the other is reflected through language,” the points put forth in this article enable 
readers to look at both language use and cultural understanding through a unique lens.  
Written by Dina Elmahi, Interfaith Muslim/Jewish Seminar: How Can We 
Foster a Grass-Root Cooperation Between Muslim and Jewish Youth in the EU? is a 
report on the “Together for Sweden” conference that took place in “cooperation with 
European Union Jewish students” in Marrakech, Morocco in 2012. Elmahi summarizes 
the structure and explains the objectives of the conference, which briefly were “to 
connect Muslim and Jewish interfaith activists, establish a sustainable network of 
Muslim and Jewish youth, exchange methodologies by which interfaith work may be 
conducted, and inform each other about ongoing projects and campaigns.”15 Later on in 
her paper, Elmahi draws conclusions based on her observations of the successes and 
shortcomings of the conference. In her beginning synopsis, she also notes that the 
“European Union of Jewish Students selected Morocco as the location for the seminar 
due to its long standing history of multi-religious coexistence between the Abrahamic 
faiths.”16 The conference involved Jewish students from the European Union and 
Canada as well as Moroccan Muslim students.  
After noting her observations, Elmahi uses her analysis of the conference’s 
outcomes to plan a structure for a conference that could take place in the future in 
                                                        
14 Interview with Jacky Kadoch, Synagogue Beth-El, Marrakech, Morocco. Conducted 
by Namratha Somayajula, 27 November 2015. 
15 Dina Elmahi, Interfaith Muslim/Jewish Seminar: How Can We Foster a Grass-Root 
Cooperation Between Muslim and Jewish Youth in the EU? (Sweden: 2012), 1-5. 
16 Dina Elmahi, Interfaith Muslim/Jewish Seminar, 1-5.  
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Sweden. When relevant, she considered her and participants’ experiences in the 
Marrakech conference within the context of such a conference in Sweden.  
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Dhimma Law and the Emergence of the Mellah 
 Jewish communities have existed in North Africa at least since the destruction of 
the Second Temple.17 Evidence also indicates some Jews may have come to Morocco 
long before 70 C.E. – inscriptions on the columns of a Jewish cemetery in Essaouira 
display the emblem of the Punic goddess, indicating “that Jews have lived in Morocco 
since the days of Nebuchadnezzar, when they escaped Babylonian captivity on 
Phœnician merchant ships.”18 
Centuries later, under Islamic rule, Jews were given dhimmi or “protected” 
status. The Islamic principle of dhimma, or security and tolerance for non-Muslims, 
originated through various written deals between the Prophet Muhammad and other 
People of the Book in Muslim lands. The foundation for such agreements was laid by 
the Pact of ‘Umar, signed between the 7th and 9th centuries C.E., and established 
between Christians and Muslims of what is now Syria. The Pact outlines restrictions 
imposed upon “the Christians of such-and-such city…in return for which [they were] to 
be given a guarantee of security.”19 The same principle–restrictions in return for rights–
was actively extended to Jews in Muslim lands during the same approximate time 
period, and is enshrined in documents such as the Constitution of the Medina.20 
                                                        
17 Samir Ben-Layashi and Bruce Maddy-Weitzmann, Myth, History and Realpolitik: 
Morocco and Its Jewish Community, (UK: Routledge, 2010), 89-106.  
18 Regina Keil-Sagawe, A Moroccan Jew with Arabo-Berber Roots, (Germany: Qantara 
de, 2011), 1.  
19 Norman Stillman, Jews of Arab Lands: A History and Source Book, (Philadelphia: 
The Jewish Publication Society of America), 158.   
20 The document establishing the dhimmi status of Yemenite Jews is noted, in the 
Arabic text included in Kirjath Sepher, vol. 9 and translated by S.D. Goitein, to have 
been written (in anno Higirae, or Islamic Hijri years) in AH 17. However, this year in 
the corresponding Julian calendar is toward the late 630s, after the Prophet 
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According to another document scripted by the Prophet’s relative Ali ibn Abi Talib, the 
Jews of Yemen were the first to earn official dhimmi status after displaying, steadfastly, 
support for the Prophet Muhammad in his battle against the local “heathens” who had 
tried to fight against him. Throughout the battle, the “Children of Israel fought in his 
vanguard…and the Prophet had extended his protection to them.”21 Though he asked 
them to keep their Sabbath, the Prophet later learned that the Jews of Yemen had fought 
for him relentlessly through Shabbat, and he is said to have told them:  “O men of the 
Children of Israel, by Allah, I shall reward you for this…I shall grant you my 
protection, my covenant, my oath, and my witness for as long as I live and as long as 
my community shall live after me, until they see my face on the Day of Resurrection.”22  
As opposed to the Pact of ‘Umar, which emphasizes restrictions, Ali ibn Abi 
Talib’s document emphasizes the protection extended to the Jews by the Prophet 
Muhammad. In the text, the Prophet Muhammad promised that the “Children of Israel” 
would: 
  be safe under Allah’s security – praised be He – and under the security of the 
Muslims and Believers....For I have taken them as my clients and extended 
protection to them…I have extended security to them in every village, in every 
market, and in all the land of the Muslims and the Believers. No wrong, no 
harm, and no crime should befall them. There shall be no legal claims against 
them, no usurpation of what is theirs, no tithing of their property, no special 
levies on their properties, nor on the fruits they bear, namely in their grain fields, 
their vineyards, and their palmeries. Allah shall not bless anyone who oppresses 
the Children of Israel even the weight of an atom. I shall testify against him on 
the Day of Resurrection.23 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Muhammad’s death. Stillman, in his discussion, notes that Geniza versions of this text 
that indicate a date near AH 9 are more fitting (AH 10 corresponds to 631-632 A.D.).  
21 Stillman, Jews of Arab Lands, 256.  
22 ibid.  
23 ibid. 
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Across dynasties, ruling bodies operating under Islamic rule and with an Islamic 
understanding of law adopted this foundational principle of tolerance toward Jews, 
applying it as seen fit in their respective societies. Although the experiences of Jewish 
communities in Morocco during each period varied depending on the sultan and on 
regional politics, as dhimmis they were legally protected and allowed to retain their 
cultural and religious practices in return for loyalty to the sultan, certain restrictions, 
and the payment of a jizya tax.24 Since dhimmi status rendered them unequal to Muslim 
subjects of the Islamic dynasties, many Jews and other non-Muslims despised the 
dhimma laws and were inadvertently harmed due to their status as dhimmis. 
Paradoxically, the protection they received under this set of laws would later become 
essential for the survival of Jews in Morocco and other French protectorates during the 
later periods, particularly when anti-Jewish decrees were issued under the Vichy 
government.25 
 Justified by the government’s obligation to protect its Jewish subjects, the local 
government in mid-15th century Fez established Morocco’s first mellah. The mellah was 
particular to North Africa, and the term indicates the walled-off quarter seen in “some 
major cities and smaller towns, where, invoking religious precepts, in a dominant 
Muslim context, the local Jewish minority was forced to reside.”26 The structure of the 
mellah is in several ways strikingly similar to that of the European ghetto. The Jews 
                                                        
24 Samir Ben-Layashi and Bruce Maddy-Weitzmann, Myth, History and Realpolitik: 
Morocco and Its Jewish Community, (UK: Routledge, 2010), 89. 
25 Ben-Layashi and Maddy-Weitzmann, “Myth, History and Realpolitik: Morocco and 
Its Jewish Community,” 97. 
26 Julio Calvo-Serrano, Fabián García-Carillo, Juan Manuel Santiago-Zaragoza, 
“Mellah: The Jews’ Quarter at the Medinas of Morocco. New Interpretation of the 
Minority’s Space in the Islamic City,” Procedia Engineering 161 (2016), 1323. 
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who lived within each were restricted in movement and activity, were treated as lesser 
citizens, and both mellahs and ghettos were built to fulfill a “policy of Jewish 
confinement.”27 However, these similarities between ghettos and mellahs should neither 
be overstated nor used to meld the European Jewish experience with that of their North 
African coreligionists, as the reasons why mellahs were created in various Moroccan 
cities differed based on the era and political climate. In North Africa, even though Jews 
were confined for political reasons, reasons to establish the mellah “notably…lacked the 
predominant discriminatory motives, religious and social in nature, that motivated 
European rulers to restrict Jews to ghettos.”28 
Even at its advent, the mellah served several different purposes and there was no 
singular reason that led to its construction in different parts of Morocco. Preexisting 
relations between Moroccan Jews and their local government, and between Jews and 
other religious populations in the society, dictated when and whether a mellah would be 
established in a given city.29 It is true that there are “basic continuities cutting across 
Moroccan Jewish society” regarding the origins of mellahs across Morocco.30 For 
instance, many argue that the mellah was first founded under the assumption that 
“keeping the Jews within close proximity to the Kasbah made it easier for the sultan to 
protect them from aggressors while allowing the makhzan (royal administration) easy 
                                                        
27 Emily Gottreich, The Mellah of Marrakesh: Jewish and Muslim Space in Morocco’s 
Red City, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 12.  
28 Shlomo Deshen, The Mellah Society, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 
20.  
29 Mainly, as mellahs were first constructed in cities, this refers to relations between 
Moroccan Jews and Muslims, and between Moroccan Jews and Christians.  
30 Emily Gottreich, “On the Origins of the Mellah of Marrakesh,” (UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 299.  
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access to their taxes and services.”31 Others describe the mellah as a “manifestation of 
inclusion and exclusion” in an Islamic city, and attribute to its establishment 
“differences in daily religious practices” and religious needs between Muslim and 
Jewish communities. And still others, uncomfortable with attributing one specific 
reason to the mellah’s advent and growing importance throughout the Middle Ages, 
note the changing function of the mellah overtime. In analyzing this evolving character, 
such scholars highlight that “when the attitude towards the Jews shifted, the role of the 
mellah changed from being a safeguard for the Jews to a means of isolating them and 
controlling them.”32 The history varies so widely between regions, however, that there 
is no specific set of years or reasons to point to for either the mellah’s advent or the 
changes in its function. Before we can fully understand the mellah’s role in shaping 
Moroccan urban society, “we have yet fully to contend with the historical reality that 
each of Morocco’s mellahs…was created at a specific moment in time and place and at 
least partly in response to local and regional circumstance.”33  
The first mellah was established in Fez by the Marinid dynasty in 1438, and was 
built immediately following an attack on Jewish residents of this northern city.34 This 
attack likely acted as a catalyst that justified the dynasty’s decision to remove Jews 
from the center of town. While other cities had different reasons for establishing Jewish 
quarters at a particular time, the pattern of mellahization, and the structure that first 
emerged in Fez were imitated over the next few centuries in other Moroccan cities with                                                         
31 Gottreich, “Origins,” 299. 
32 Dana Lovrek, “Public Health in the Mellah of Merrakesh from 1879-1912,” 
(Milwaukee: University of Wisconsin, 2012), 1.   
33 Gottreich, “Origins,” 288. 
34 Daniel Schroeter, The Shifting Boundaries of Moroccan Jewish Identities, (USA: 
Indiana University Press, 2008), 155. 
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significant Jewish populations. In the southern city of Marrakech, for example, a 
combination of factors, rather than one singular catalyzing event, led to the creation of 
the mellah between 1557 and 1563. Here, attacks on the Jewish population in 
Marrakech were more of a result of the mellah’s construction rather than its cause. 
There are two main reasons, among the many, that historian Emily Gottreich points to 
as impetuses for the mellah’s establishment in Marrakech. The first is the population 
influx to Marrakech – and Morocco as a whole – from the Iberian Peninsula and other 
parts of Europe during the Sa’adi period.35 Though Marrakech was not as severely 
affected by this population influx as other cities were, the impacts of population 
pressure were still manifested in strained relations between the two main groups of 
dhimmis – Christians and Jews – in Marrakech. As a result of the consequential “high 
visibility of non-Muslim immigrants” in Marrakech, and the disruption they seemed to 
be creating, “clear hierarchies of space” were created in the city.36   
Secondly, the Sa’adi rulers of Marrakech, in competition with the northern 
capital of Fez, found that the mellah was a “crucial element of Fāsī urban life [that] was 
lacking in Marrakesh” as it provided to the rulers a spatial way to demonstrate their 
control of inter-group relations.37 As a result, in order to legitimize their own rule of 
Marrakech, the Sa’adis built the Marrakech mellah. The experiences of the communities 
after the mellah’s construction, in Marrakech and other mellah cities across Morocco, 
                                                        
35 For more information on the population influx to Morocco during this time period, 
and the impact it had on intra-dhimmi relations, see Emily Gottreich’s article, On the 
Origins of the Mellah of Marrakesh. The Sa’adis ruled Morocco from the mid-16th 
century to the mid-17th century, and during this time period, city structure underwent 
significant and enduring changes.  
36 Gottreich, “Origins,” 298.  
37 Gottreich, The Mellah of Marrakesh, 27. 
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however, also expose the impacts – intentional and unintentional – the institution had on 
inter-group dynamics over the next few centuries.   
 
Economic Interdependence in the Mellah Society  
Despite the varying reasons for their construction, after they were built, mellahs 
across Morocco served similar functions. The mellah became an important institution in 
Moroccan urban settings over the years, as it influenced patterns that affected the 
economic and social functioning of the Moroccan city and shaped the interactions of 
Moroccans across its walls. Though it was meant to seclude, the mellah was not only a 
space “fully invested with meaning as Jewish space,” but also “fully integrated into its 
urban setting” in the Moroccan city.38 In most cities that underwent mellahization in 
Morocco, the walls of the mellah were porous and allowed for economic and cultural 
exchanges to continue freely between Muslim and Jewish residents of the city.39 
Though the direct evidence is relatively sparse, researchers have found, across most 
Moroccan cities, that Jewish and Muslim communities formed relationships of 
economic interdependence across the mellah’s borders. A case study of the coastal city 
of Salé indicates that: 
The Jews and Muslims of Salé maintained close economic relations, and during 
the expansion of commerce the Jews often acted as creditors for their Muslim 
compatriots. Moreover they sometimes formed partnerships in commerce or property, 
especially in the commercial quarters which developed in the New Mellah and Sīdī 
Turkī during the early years of the protectorate. Although detailed evidence is lacking, 
Jews and Muslims in Salé had apparently maintained ties of economic interdependence                                                         
38 Susan Gilson Miller, Attilio Petruciioli, and Mauro Bertagnin, “Inscribing Minority 
Space in the Islamic City: The Jewish Quarter of Fez (1438-1912),” Journal of the 
Society of Architectural Historians 60 No. 3 (2001), 310.  
39 Daniel Schroeter, The Shifting Boundaries of Moroccan Jewish Identities, (USA: 
Indiana University Press, 2008), 155. 
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for centuries, and these developed still further with the penetration of European trade 
(italics added).40  
 
Modern scholars who study economic interdependence between separate states 
in the context of international relations generally fall into one of two schools of thought. 
The first of these concludes that economic interdependence between states serves as an 
incentive for good relations–economic, political, and social–because if such relations 
were to deteriorate, each state would face the consequences of significant economic 
losses.41 Those who adhere to the view of this liberal school point to “the European 
Union as a prime example of the power of economic interdependence to hold together 
in peace countries with a long and bitter history of wars and conflicts between 
themselves.”42  
The second school contradicts this notion, stating that, while economic 
interdependence might have short-term benefits for each economy, in the long-term, it 
serves to undermine peace and security between states. Interdependence, they say, is 
unstable, because economic relationships rarely function under a balanced power 
dynamic. Rather, economic interdependence can, and often does, slowly evolve into a 
hierarchical relationship of economic dependency. This realist argument takes the 
disagreements that arise with increased interaction between humans into account, noting 
that “as trade and prosperity increases over time, so…does the range of economic issues 
over which disputes can emerge, sometimes leading to violent conflict.”43 In an arena 
                                                        
40 Kenneth Brown, People of Salé: Tradition and Change in a Moroccan City, 1830-
1930, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1976), 159.  
41 Derek Braddon, “The Role of Economic Interdependence in the Origins and 
Resolution of Conflict,” Revue d’économie politique 122 No. 2 (2012), 301. 
42 Braddon, “Economic Interdependence,” 301.  
43 Braddon, “Economic Interdependence,” 301. 
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where interaction is inevitable, however, purposefully establishing a system of mutual 
benefit to all those involved may prove to be effective in the long term. 
Semi-autonomous nations within states, like all economic sub-units, ultimately 
operate within the same state system and are each subject to the state’s economic 
policies and trends – therefore, not all of the theories associated with interstate conflict 
and economic interdependency can apply. However, particularly when these sub-units 
are operating within distinct spaces in the same state, and, due to their operation within 
overlapping spaces where interaction is inevitable and often necessary, some aspects of 
economic interdependency theory can be used to analyze intrastate dynamics.  
After mellahs were established, the Jews and Muslims of Morocco operated 
within their separate but overlapping spheres, and the specialization of labor was 
divided along lines of religious identity. In Morocco’s mellah society, “Jews were 
primarily petty tradesman and artisans, serving special needs of the Muslim population. 
A general form of economic symbiosis developed over the centuries, in which Jews 
exchanged goods and services for the agricultural staples and craft skills of the 
Muslims.”44 The formation of these relations was natural, but did not go unnoticed and 
was critiqued by certain political groups, who were concerned that such ties would 
obstruct the Jewish community’s semi-autonomous status. On the political level, 
therefore, Jewish institutions whose leaders were of this opinion made extra efforts to 
expand and make more distinct the institutions’ spheres of influence within the mellah 
                                                        
44 Alex Weingrod, “Reciprocal Change: A Case Study of a Moroccan Immigrant 
Village in Israel,” The Middle East Journal 14 No. 3 (1960).   
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and in spaces where Jewish economic influence pervaded.45 Despite their efforts, 
however, personal relationships between Jewish and Muslim tradesmen and clients 
continued over the centuries, and in the absence of widespread political tension, the 
formation of these relationships undermined the Moroccan government’s and the 
sectarian institutions’ political efforts to completely separate the communities into their 
respective spaces.  
Jerry Harris’s analysis of such “two-dimensional interdependence” of state 
economies sheds light on the changing conditions later in Moroccan history that may 
have led to the strengthening of national identities among Muslims and Jews in 
Morocco, and eventually, increasing separation between the two groups.46 He discusses 
the impact of economic interdependence on the development of the goals, means and 
overall success of internal separatist groups, stating that, in analyzing the causes of 
separatist movements, one must “acknowledge the role played by economic factors [as] 
directly or indirectly, economic factors impose constraints on, and provide opportunities 
for, separatist movements. The principles he focuses on can be used to inform an 
understanding of how economic interdependence impacts minority-majority group 
relations, as various factors that influence economic dynamics served to further separate 
Jews in Morocco from their Muslim compatriots.47  
                                                        
45 Stephen Sharot, Comparative Perspectives on Judaism and Jewish Identities, 
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2011): 29.  
46 Jerry Harris, The Nation in the Global Era: Conflict and Transformation, (Boston: 
Brill, 2009), 321.  
47 These changing dynamics became most apparent, and indeed were in large part 
caused by, the era of French influence. For more information on how French influence 
affected the economic relationship between Muslims and Jews in Morocco, see pp. 52 
to 55 of this thesis.  
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In pre-protectorate Morocco’s particular case, however, because of the natural 
overlap between Jewish and Muslim spheres of economic influence within the overall 
Moroccan state, causality in relation to intrastate tension is difficult to discern.48 That is, 
the strength of the link between pre-protectorate Muslim-Jewish economic 
interdependency and the political tensions that emerged and escalated intermittently 
between the two groups remains unclear, though each had some effect on the other.49  
The relatively uneventful interaction between Jewish and Muslim economies in 
Morocco for several centuries, the foundation of which was laid by the mellah years, 
serves as an example of both the liberal and realist schools of thought associated with 
economic interdependency theory, in a local context. On the one hand, certain Jewish 
institutions saw the porosity of the mellah’s walls as a threat to their already limited 
control of Jewish space in Morocco. On the other hand, the dependence of each 
community on the other established a sense of mutual reliability and need, and because 
of the specialization of labor along lines of identity, both communities would be 
significantly affected in the unlikely case that total separation could be maintained. 
                                                        
48 More informed analysis of the economic dynamics within Morocco would be needed 
in order to better understand the relationship between economic interdependency and 
intrastate tensions in this context.  
49 The term “pre-protectorate” is referring to the eras in Moroccan history preceding the 
French political presence. In the context of this chapter, the term refers to the time 
period between the establishment of the mellah as an influential institution and the 
arrival of the French in 1912. This distinction is important because the French 
protectorate increased Moroccan interaction with France and other European states – 
which, at the time, were becoming more cognizant of complications with the second-
class status of Jews – adding an extra element of interstate economic and political 
relations. The French economic establishment in Morocco soon served to privilege the 
Moroccan Jewish minority over the Muslim majority, and therefore created additional 
political tensions on both sides, associated with economic opportunity and political 
inequality, that were not so significant or as openly addressed before the French 
dimension came into being.   
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Because the Muslim population was dominant, however, the reliability between the two 
groups was mutual but not equal. The lack of balance, and the duality of the situation 
brings to light the variety of factors that fed the changing dynamics between Muslims 
and Jews in Morocco throughout the country’s history. 
The economic bonds described above are a key example of the patterns resulting 
from mellahization – after the institution’s advent, these patterns continued and became 
well established over the next few centuries. While the division of economic 
responsibilities along lines of religious identity became an integral aspect of Moroccan 
society for centuries, these specific economic responsibilities also pushed each 
community to depend on the other to maintain a well-rounded state economy and for 
each city to fully function. The bonds built across physical barriers in this way were the 
foundation of a bridge between the two communities. This bridge was in ways was 
strengthened over the years, despite the government’s efforts to physically separate 
Moroccan Jews from the rest of Moroccan society.  
When Muslims and Jews entered the other’s spaces in mellah-era Morocco, the 
activities were indeed mainly economic. As Jews did in the medina50, “Muslims came 
to the Jewish quarter not only to buy, but also to sell their own goods and services.”51 
The economic interdependence was, therefore, not only on a market-to-market level but 
also on an individual level, as many traditional economic activities depended on 
individual craftsmanship and service. The cross-cultural interactions, though in large 
part focused on business, were frequent and fairly organic, and therefore accepted as a 
natural part of the Moroccan way of life, particularly in urban areas.                                                          
50 The medina is the pre-colonial Muslim quarter of a Moroccan city.  
51 Gottreich, The Mellah of Marrakesh, 74. 
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This is all not to say, however, that good relations between Muslims and Jews in 
Morocco were consistent, or that the physical separation of the communities through the 
establishment of the mellah was not detrimental in any way. Even in the economic 
arena, Jews faced harassment, as economic activities were frequently not confined to 
cities. Studies of economic activity reveal that, in the nineteenth century, “over one-half 
of male Jews earned their living by traveling for extended periods in tribal areas away 
from the cities.”52 Thus, many urban Jews, identifiable and distinguished from Muslim 
travelers by their clothing, spent the majority of their time traveling in the hinterlands 
amongst non-Jews with who they had not yet formed any sort of personal or economic 
tie. To ensure greater safety for their travels, Moroccan Jews learned how to 
preemptively form ties with patrons that extended further than payments for goods and 
services.  
Frequently [the ties] included handicraft and business services that continued for 
a lifetime; sometimes these even passed from one generation to the next. In this 
manner, patron-client relations were bolstered by family tradition, feelings of 
loyalty and trust. Occasionally, there was also a sacral element to these ties, such 
as when they were forged by , an oath and animal sacrifice at the doorstep of the 
Muslim patron. The principle guiding the ‘ar was that an important personage 
brought shame upon himself if he refused a request made by a person of lower 
status making a sacrifice on his doorstep.53 
 
Through interactions like these, Jewish culture in both urban and rural areas, 
remained an integral and accepted part of Morocco’s diverse character. Ben-Layashi 
and Maddy-Weitzman (2010) note that many non-urban Moroccan Jewish communities 
of this time lived in close proximity to and had generally good relations with the 
indigenous Amazigh, or Berber, populations–speaking “Judaeo-Berber” and maintained 
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53 Deshen, The Mellah Society, 21.  
 30 
 
a shared culture. For such groups, “certain prayers, such as the benedictions of the 
Torah, were said in Tamazight54…and there are even fragments of a Haggadah in 
Tamazight, transcribed in Hebrew characters.”55 Furthermore, “prior to French 
penetration, Jews were largely protected by local Berber leaders…This form of 
protection became hereditary. The children of the protectors inherited the role of 
protecting the Jews’ children.”56 This way of ensuring greater security was similar to 
that established by ‘ar oaths between traveling Jewish merchants outside of their city 
and their Muslim patrons in the hinterlands they frequented. Though the extensiveness 
of such practices as these differed based on the degree of tolerance in the political 
climate, these relationships are a few of many examples of the coexistence across 
cultures and religions that continued to characterize Moroccan society through periods 
of political chaos.  
Protection of Jews through government policy – which simultaneously served to 
differentiate Jews from the rest of the population, characterize them as outsiders, and 
make them depend on protection – was limited in mellah-era Morocco and extended 
solely to the mellah space. As demonstrated through the pacts formed between Jews and 
Muslims or Amazigh tribes-people, safety in other spaces was in large part dependent 
on personal relationships. In theory, Jews were offered legal protections in all of 
Morocco due to their status as dhimmis; however, the laws were enforced to varying 
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 31 
 
degrees, and the creation of the mellah as a way of protecting the Jews created the 
illusion that the dhimma contract was being upheld. In reality, the provisions of the 
dhimma contract that dictated restrictions in Jews’ behavior–restrictions to which they 
dhimmis had agreed in return for protection–served to clearly separate Jews from the 
rest of Moroccan society and indeed made them more vulnerable by emphasizing their 
status as second-class citizens. Outside of the mellah space, they were frequently treated 
as such by their Muslim compatriots, and the degree to which they were discriminated 
against in day-to-day interactions outside of the mellah tended to correlate inversely to 
how strongly dhimmi laws were enforced by particular sultans.57 Dhimma law, in a 
sense, served to legitimize the notion that Jews were not truly citizens of Morocco and 
were therefore only worthy of being protected in certain spaces.  
Despite the constraints that dhimma laws placed on the Jews’ relationship with 
Moroccan Muslim society and the ruling parties, they were one of few minority groups 
that was offered this privileged–albeit, severely limited–protection. Because of their 
unique status, the manner in which Jews were treated by their government and by 
Muslims in Moroccan society during a particular political era served as a microcosm of 
Morocco’s relative political stability as a whole.58 The Jews were “part and parcel” of 
the process of Morocco’s political and socioeconomic development. Their treatment 
relative to Moroccan Muslims, therefore, sheds light on a specific governing body’s true 
legitimacy and tolerance for minorities who in an unstable situation might be seen as a 
threat to the dominant group’s power. Moulay Ismaïl, the second ruler of the Moroccan 
Alaouite dynasty, is remembered for the climate of relative safety and security he                                                         
57 Gottreich, The Mellah of Marrakesh, 93.  
58 Levy, “City and Society,” 250.  
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created and maintained during his rule of Morocco. This climate was tolerant enough 
that, generally, “ ‘even a woman or dhimmi could travel from Oujda to Wadi Nul 
unmolested’ (Stillman 1974:17).”59  
 Under less tolerant rulers, the restrictions of dhimma law were more strictly 
enforced, and as a result, Jews were more easily identified based on their behavior in 
accordance with these laws. Under strictly enforced dhimma law, Jews were prohibited 
from riding “horses (for these are noble beasts), to wear shoes in the vicinity of 
mosques, to wear colorful clothes, to carry arms, to build synagogues, and so on.”60 
Other reports indicate that, during certain time periods, Jews were required to remove 
their shoes upon leaving the mellah, and to walk barefoot throughout the medina. It was 
the application of such laws as these that varied widely on the local level, particularly 
up until the 19th century. Even though the laws were originally enacted to prevent 
administrative mistakes, the rules soon became forms of humiliation, and regulations 
regarding Jews’ behavior and clothing made them visibly vulnerable targets outside of 
the mellah.   
 As seen in most societies that must negotiate the rights of minorities in relation 
to a majority population, bias and the enforcement of discriminatory provisions by the 
Moroccan government implicitly permitted Moroccan society at-large to treat Jews with 
disrespect and sometimes to harm them.  Jews were subject to the whims of the sultan 
and local leaders, and their status in Morocco significantly declined in the late 1800s, 
when the pasha Umalik began giving special attention to Jews’ clothing and 
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appearance.61 Before Umalik, Jews had been allowed to wear shoes in most parts of the 
medina, except for areas in front of mosques, but Umalik added further restrictions to 
this freedom as well. When a Jewish man under Umalik’s rule walked with his shoes on 
through the medina–in a part where shoes had until that point been allowed– “a soldier 
who noticed him threw a rock at his head and opened a large wound that gushed 
blood…We have become the bêtes noires of the Arabs, who hit us each time they see us 
in the medina.”62 These fluctuations in the treatment of the Jews in Moroccan cities 
continued to vary, and the dynamics were further complicated by the increasing 
involvement of European powers in Moroccan affairs by the end of the 18th century.  
 
Jews in Protectorate-Era Morocco 
 French interests in Morocco began long before the Protectorate was 
officially established. With the beginnings of French involvement in Moroccan affairs 
came many changes in the position of Moroccan Jews relative to Moroccan society as a 
whole. A significant example that points to this changing status is the increasing 
prevalence of Moroccan Jews in government positions – many served as agents, 
translators, and local representatives of European powers.63 Because of the foreign 
language skills that many Moroccan Jews had, and due to their social and economic 
transnational ties, many Moroccan Jews seeking higher civil status earned these                                                         
61 Proving the volatility of the Jews’ situation, treatment toward the Jews had bettered 
significantly by the early 1902 and laws against them were even more strict in 1910 
than they were in 1880. For more information about the different extremes of treatment 
toward Jews in Muslim space during particular time periods, see Gottreich, “The Mellah 
of Marrakesh,” chapter four.  
62 Emily Gottreich, The Mellah of Marrakesh, 95.  
63 Gottreich, The Mellah of Marrakesh, 7. 
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government positions and served as liaisons between the French government and the 
Muslims in Morocco with whom they shared local knowledge and culture.64 As a result 
of their dominance in these positions, combined with their historically transnational 
status, Jews often inadvertently became informants for the French government. 
Consequentially, they were eventually seen by some of their fellow Moroccans as 
conspirators who helped enable the French to establish control over the country.  
These government positions that Jews held brought with them an elevated status 
that was of political and economic benefit and social detriment. The French-Moroccan 
commercial treaty, signed in 1767, exacerbated divisions along lines of both religious 
identity and economic class by providing special privileges for Moroccans – both 
Muslims and Jews – under European employ. This treaty granted special political and 
tax exemption rights to government officials, who were deemed protégés of the 
European powers, but not of the sultan.65 The resulting friction between members of 
different socio-economic classes culminated in a series of attacks against Jews and 
Muslims of the upper classes toward the end of the 19th century, and, “on the eve of the 
Protectorate,” in the early 20th century, “these attacks began to specifically target the 
mellahs and the Jewish businesses.”66 While the upper-class Jews were held in disdain 
by the majority of the lower-class Muslim population at the time, it is important to note 
that “in terms of their economic conditions, the bulk of Moroccan Jews experienced 
                                                        
64 Laskier, Alliance Israélite Universelle, 39. 
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very nearly the same squalor and grinding poverty as the Muslim masses.”67 The 
separation of upper-class Moroccan Jews from the rest of Moroccan society created an 
interesting paradox: a small proportion of protégés, who were predominantly upper-
class Moroccan Jews, were in close contact with the governing colonial body to whom 
the majority Muslim population were subject while the vast number of Jews in Morocco 
lived in subordination to this majority Muslim population.68 Regardless, Jews as a 
group were seen as accomplices of the colonial government. This perception grew as 
France officially began its rule of Morocco and brought with it more promises for 
Moroccan Jews than it did for the Moroccan population as a whole.  
France had become increasingly involved in Moroccan affairs over the course of 
the 19th century in multiple spheres. Not only did the French come with a colonial 
fervor, but also brought with them to Morocco the echoes of European ideas advocating 
for the rights of religious minorities.69 After the European Revolutions and particularly 
after the age of the Enlightenment, changes had begun to occur in French society 
regarding the position of French Jews; Jews and Christians started to negotiate the 
status of Jews in European society, and eventually, the Jews’ position alongside their 
Christian countrymen was elevated.70 During the first half of the nineteenth century, 
when France’s power began rapidly extending south toward Morocco, Jews in Western 
Europe were encouraged by the relatively more equal status many of them had gained in 
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European society and were determined to help Jews in other regions of the world 
achieve the same.71 From 1830 onward, Jews in Morocco and other North African 
countries were increasingly exposed to revolutionary ideas that were being exchanged 
among European citizens.  
Discussions about societal inequalities were much more complicated in the 
Moroccan context due to the “triangular” and hierarchical “relationship between 
colonized Jews, the colonizing power, and French Jewish citizens.”72 Due to the 
unequal and inconsistent treatment the majority of Jews received as dhimmis, Moroccan 
Jews hoped that the Moroccan government would adopt such ideas as well, and that the 
ideas would be supported by Moroccan Muslim society at large.73 Instead, the 
encroachment of European ideas into Moroccan affairs, coupled with the 
socioeconomic divisions within the Jewish community and between Jews and Muslims, 
served to create increasing mutual fear and tension between Jewish and Muslim citizens 
of Morocco. As discussed above, the socioeconomic position of educated urban Jews in 
relation to the majority of their Muslim neighbors began to change and as the European 
powers started to encroach upon the sultan’s rule, dhimmi status started becoming less 
apparent, even for Jews who were not serving in government positions. De jure dhimma 
law effectively continued, however, until the official beginning of the French 
Protectorate in 1912.  
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The Alliance Israélite Universelle and Moroccan Jews 
As Moroccan Jews struggled to bring the ideals of “liberté, égalité, et fraternité” 
to their fellow Moroccans, European Jews even outside of France began to advocate 
strongly for the rights of their Moroccan co-religionists; Sir Moses Montefiore, who 
came to Morocco from Britain in the 1860s, condemned the humiliation and harm to 
which Moroccan Jews were subject, and convinced the Sultan Muhammad IV to legally 
ensure that “Israélites”74 under his empire would be treated with “utmost 
benevolence.”75  His visit is often seen as the point after which Morocco was faced with 
consistent “foreign diplomatic pressure intertwined with European Jewish concerns” 
that from then on dictated Muslim-Jewish relations in Morocco.76 While they received 
the support of their advocates from Europe, Moroccan Jews were faced with the 
uncomfortable position of being singled out by foreign powers, and in that manner, 
were further alienated from their Muslim compatriots. 
Due to the efforts of French Jews particularly, the Alliance Israélite Universelle 
became one of the main instruments by which Western European Jews sought to 
ameliorate the situation of their Moroccan – and other non-Western – brothers and 
sisters.77 The Alliance was founded in France in 1860, and, by bringing enlightened 
Western education to Eastern Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East, its primary 
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goal was to help Jews in these regions rise out of their status as unequal citizens.78  
More specifically, the AIU was created to help Jews who were facing unjust 
circumstances, harm, or forced conversion in predominantly Christian or Muslim 
countries in these three regions. Morocco was, in fact, the AIU’s special project, and it 
left a legacy there that remains significant to this day. In its activities within and outside 
of Morocco, the AIU had three main goals. First, it sought to work “toward the 
emancipation and moral progress of the Jews” through French secular education.79 
Cognizant of the opposition it might face from North African Jews attached to their 
traditions, however, the AIU from the beginning tried to find a balance between the 
integration of progressive Western ideas and traditional North African Jewish education 
in its model of curriculum.80 While furthering what its leaders called the moral progress 
of Jews in these countries, the AIU also intended to lend “effective support to all those 
who suffer because of their membership in the Jewish faith.” Lastly, the Alliance 
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worked to make European leaders and the enlightened European public aware of the 
injustices Jews continued to face around the world.81 
With these goals laying its foundation, the first AIU school was opened in 
Tetouan in 1862, and the Alliance was supported over the following decades by the 
French consulate in Essaouira.82 In part because it had, during the time of the AIU’s 
establishment, the largest Jewish population of any country in the region, Morocco was 
fertile ground for the development of the AIU’s interests. After a number of years, the 
AIU operated in tandem a total of eighty-three schools in Morocco – more than the 
number of schools it operated in all other countries combined.83 French was the 
language of instruction in these schools, as the AIU leaders saw French language 
instruction in Morocco as a gateway to modern French culture for Moroccan Jews. 
 The Alliance attempted to emancipate Moroccan Jews by eliminating the 
practices that Western society saw as backward. It strove to modernize them through 
“Western education and political reform.”84 This modernization goal was in line with 
the broader Protectorate government’s goal for Moroccan society and economy as a 
whole. 
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The Modernizing Economy and Changing Roles of Moroccan Jews 
 Before the French entered Morocco, Moroccan Jews were limited in the scope 
of economic activities they could pursue, due to the specialization of labor that occurred 
along religious lines as mellah society developed. The semi-permeable mellah over the 
five centuries preceding French presence in Morocco somewhat isolated the Jewish 
community from the Muslim medina; however, the mellah also brought with it a degree 
of autonomy within the Jewish communities, autonomy that vanished as the French 
government consolidated its power and controlled, in a different way than the sultan, 
the Jews’ economic activities.  
In 1918, after the first six years of the Protectorate, the sultan of Morocco issued 
a dahir85 to promote reorganization of economic roles within the Moroccan Jewish 
communities, the purpose of which was to promote “modernization” among reorganized 
groups.86 This goal of modernization characterized much of France’s engagement with 
the Jews of Morocco–and Moroccan society as a whole–during the Protectorate years, 
particularly in the period directly preceding World War II. Morocco’s location at the 
crossroads of Europe, Africa and the Middle East allowed the French to treat it as a 
center of international trade, and as European capitalism began taking over the once-
traditional Moroccan economy, many of its once-thriving economic centers began to 
rapidly decline.87  
Though Moroccan Jews were thought of as eager to modernize and acculturate 
to the French economic way of life because of the political advantages Europeanization 
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would offer them, it was in cities where Jews were most active that changes took place 
most slowly. Marrakech, southern Morocco’s largest economic center toward the end of 
the nineteenth century, was one of the last major cities to adopt a more European 
structure. The mellah of Marrakech was porous enough that the Jews’ economic 
activities – which were mainly in crafting and manual labor – were essential to the 
viability of the Marrakech economy and tightly intertwined with the activities of 
Muslims in the medina. As a result, this city could more easily resist the invasiveness of 
European economic behavior. Over the years, however, as French influence became 
increasingly prevalent, tradesmen in Marrakech found themselves establishing 
economic ties to Europe while still maintaining local ones.88 The French maintained 
adequate control over their economic routes in Morocco, but as the importance of local 
economy declined, so did the sultan’s control over the few local routes that remained in 
use. As a result, the merchants that continued trading along these routes and developing 
their local economy while simultaneously integrating into the European globalized 
economy were traveling part of the time on routes that had fallen to disuse and that were 
no longer regulated. Due to the lack of regulation, they were susceptible to exploitation, 
robbery and murder “en route... Jewish merchants were particularly vulnerable at the 
eleven or so nazālas (toll stations) that dotted the route between Marrakesh and 
Essaouira.”89 
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Rural-Urban Differences Between Jews Under Protectorate Morocco 
Undoubtedly, friction grew with European influence and French colonial power 
in Morocco between Muslims, Jews, and the colonial body, particularly as a result of 
new economic policies and changing socioeconomic status. The effect of French 
policies and institutions was most immediately seen in strategically located urban areas, 
where these institutions concentrated their activities. In the rural south in particular, “the 
reforms implemented in the early part of the French protectorate had little impact,” due 
to the distance of the rural south from the French colonial center and the lack of 
institutions established there that acted as extensions of French rule.90 Even previously 
significant urban centers in the south of Morocco were at first neglected in the colonial 
modernization movement, and cities like Essaouira faced rapid emigration of their elite, 
including Jewish tradesmen and merchants, who moved to new, modernized port cities 
such as Casablanca, Rabat, Agadir, and Safi.91  
 The AIU was one of the most effective arms of the French colonial effort that 
sought particularly to modernize the Jewish population of Morocco. Like the French 
colonial government as a whole, the Alliance faced difficulty establishing its presence 
in the south of Morocco, in cities like Marrakech as well as in southern rural areas such 
as Akka and Goulmim.92 This difficulty was due to a variety of factors – geographical, 
cultural, and institutional.  
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Marrakech, an interior city, was exposed to the Europeans later on than coastal 
cities were, and even when foreigners began to enter Marrakech toward the end of the 
19th century, they “were taken aback by the cold welcome they received from the 
denizens of the mellah, who treated even foreign Jews with suspicion.”93 To add to the 
suspicion, in the Moroccan rural south, Jews and Muslims, while separated into the 
mellah and medina, lived in much closer proximity to one another, and the mellah was 
more integrated into the walled villages. This “spatial proximity between Muslim and 
Jewish households reinforced social and cultural warmth despite the religious 
differences,” and still allowed people in the Jewish minority to retain their own 
practices in their own space.94 In these hinterlands, there were few significant pre-
existing divides that a foreign presence could mitigate or exacerbate.  
The southern resistance to welcoming Europeans can be interpreted as a 
resistance to modernization, rather than to the Europeans themselves. In the Moroccan 
south, “the orthodoxy of the Jews is as strict and conservative as that of the 
Mohammedans…This uncompromising religious attitude makes the Moroccan Jews as 
suspicious of Christians as they are of the Jews of other countries”95 who, in the 
Western sense, had undergone a modern transformation before they arrived in Morocco 
to bring the same to Moroccan Jews.96   
Throughout the 1930s, disenfranchised rural Jews from the south were losing 
access to a secure livelihood as their traditional local economy slowly became obsolete.                                                         
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At the same time, they were not seeing the benefits of a modernized European economy 
manifest in their lifestyle. By the time the Alliance was able to effectively make its way 
into southern Morocco, in the late 1930s, these Jews had already begun leaving 
Morocco to find opportunity elsewhere, primarily in Palestine. The AIU continued to 
concentrate and develop its efforts in the rural south, however, focusing on those who 
had chosen to stay. The importance of appealing to tradition is seen clearly through 
accounts describing the success of certain teachers in the south. These teachers were 
trained at specific AIU training schools that taught them to maintain a balance between 
modern secular education and the traditional education that until the AIU’s 
establishment in the south had been the responsibility of local rabbis. Rabbis were hired 
by the AIU schools to teach Hebrew language, and “in order not to alienate the local 
community, the Alliance curriculum included biblical history.”97 Despite the difficulties 
of trying to establish legitimacy within a disillusioned and rapidly emigrating 
population, the AIU persevered in developing its efforts in this way in the south until 
the early 1960s.  
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Arab Nationalism, Zionism, and the Emigration of Moroccan Jews 
After the beginning of the twentieth century, and coinciding with the arrival of 
the French, the question of Moroccan identity had started to permeate the society. 
Identity politics in Morocco were constructed in large part by French policies. While 
not all of the most impactful policies were implemented to divide Moroccan Muslims 
and Moroccan Jews, the separation of Arabs from other Moroccans as facilitated by 
French policy as well as external factors all played a role in separating Jewish religious 
identity and Moroccan national identity from each other.  
Modern nationalism in Morocco can be traced back to the mid-nineteenth 
century, when Moroccans began resisting European penetration, and failed at warding 
off the impending French Protectorate, which was established in 1912.98 The fight 
continued in phases until independence in 1956, and particularly during the last thirty 
years of the Protectorate, the tension between the French and the majority of the 
Moroccan public allowed for the increasing separation of ethnic and religious groups in 
Morocco.  
Halstead (1967) notes that France’s governing system in Morocco impacted, 
positively, reforms in government structure that were put in place after independence, 
and that were demanded by nationalists while the French Protectorate was still in 
place.99 He also speaks, however, of the many more detrimental effects the colonial 
government had on Morocco’s social, political, and economic norms. Regardless of a 
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few positive impacts, the French presence created internal strife between ethnic and 
religious groups in Morocco and caused deep disillusionment among Moroccans.  
The modern nationalist movement simmered throughout the 1920s, taking shape 
over those years through secret societies based in urban centers such as Rabat, Fès, and 
Salé. The nationalist consciousness was further strengthened by the beginning of the 
next decade and reached an unprecedented level of cohesiveness. The sudden 
radicalization of the nationalist movement was in part catalyzed by Moroccans’ strong 
reactions against a specific law, the 1930 “Berber dahir.” This dahir was a piece of 
legislation that the sultan issued under the rule of the French Protectorate to grant legal 
legitimacy to Amazigh (Berber) law, and, under a certain article that was later 
rescinded, to hold Amazigh people accountable under French penal code for certain 
crimes.100 Because this decree served to separate Arabs and Berbers from one another 
based on ethnic background, it was met with loud opposition from the Moroccan 
majority. This opposition formed the basis for an “organic national unity against efforts 
to differentiate between previously undifferentiated ethnolinguistic groups.”101 Further, 
the dahir and the differentiation between these groups created suspicion among 
Moroccan Muslims that the colonial French were attempting to “convert Berbers to 
Christians, replace Arabic with French, and otherwise foment schisms in the 
population” as part of their overall “divide and rule” policy.102 The natural integration 
of Arabs and Berbers had been, up until then, a traditional and unique characteristic of                                                         
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the country that had persisted despite the Moorish government’s efforts centuries earlier 
to completely transform Morocco into an Arab Islamic society. The passage of this 
decree tarnished this admirable trait of Moroccan society and was consequentially met 
with immediate resistance.  
By the early 1930s, following the Berber dahir, the somewhat fragmented 
societies that had begun developing in the previous decade had evolved into more 
organized programs such as the clandestine groups Zawiya and Taifa, and the publicly 
known Kutlat al-Amal al-Watani.103 Loosely translated, the Kutlat eventually became 
known as the Moroccan Action Committee (Comité d’Action Marocaine).  In 1934, this 
Committee put forth a comprehensive “Plan of Reforms” that called for a return to 
indirect rule, admission of Moroccans to government positions, and establishment of 
representative councils.”104 The Committee was led by Allal al-Fassi, and, particularly 
in its beginnings, attracted young Moroccan Muslim urban elite, who, like the urban 
masses, rejected and were left out of the Europeanized culture that the French tried to 
recreate in Morocco. As a result, because the French bestowed opportunities on those 
who cooperated in subservience, and that too, only within certain socioeconomic, 
religious, or ethnic groups, these urban youth were not reaping the benefits they felt 
their socioeconomic status would entitle them to under autonomous national 
conditions.105 As the movement grew and developed, it later melded with another group 
to form the right-wing, nationalist Istiqlal Party. At the start of the Second World War, 
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the Istiqlal Party changed its rhetoric, and, instead of asking for reform, issued demands 
for complete Moroccan independence.  
The close association of Moroccan national identity with Arab Muslim 
ethnoreligious identity from the 1930s onward was due in large part to the political and 
economic separation between Muslims and Jews, and between Arab and Amazigh 
populations, that was facilitated by French policies during the Protectorate. Added to 
the internal factors that led to the singular approach of Morocco’s nationalist rhetoric, 
however, were various external factors that dictated how the Arab Muslim nationalist 
movement in Morocco would develop.  
One of these external forces was the involvement of foreign powers in the quest 
for autonomy in colonized North African and Middle Eastern countries. Pre-
Protectorate Morocco was proud of its integrated and diverse culture. As it stands 
geographically on the edge of the Arab world it’s economic and political history even 
before the French Protectorate era allowed to serve as a bridge between the Arab world, 
Europe, and sub-Saharan Africa. Despite this unique position, Morocco was still 
considered to be an important part of the Arab world. The contrast between historical 
Arab culture and colonial European culture was stark on the Moroccan stage as the 
French attempted to assimilate certain groups of Moroccans into a Europeanized way of 
life that had not previously existed in their country.  
French assimilationist policy was directly attacked when foreign Arab powers 
addressed the issue of the Protectorate. These diplomatic attacks were relatively 
infrequent; however, the opposition by outside powers to Western influence entering 
Morocco implies “that there [was] a great fear of Morocco being swept into the Western 
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sphere of civilization; that the memory of Arabic past greatness [was] seeking to 
reconstitute the old Eastern empire based on racial solidarity and that Morocco must be 
included as a part of the Arab Homeland.”106 
Toward the end of the French Protectorate, a movement sweeping across the 
greater Middle East began to penetrate Morocco as well. The ideas of Arab unity and, 
later, Pan-Arabism,107 took hold. While it was gaining popularity, the Pan-Arabism 
movement made “the Arabic language the basic criterion of Arab unity…[and] with the 
spread of modern education among the Muslims, the Muslim Arabs began to emphasize 
Islam as a unifying force among the Arab-speaking peoples.”108 Alluding to the 
Moroccan masses’ fears that the colonial influence would replace Arabic with French 
and convert Muslims to Christianity, Arab nationalism grew in its popularity. A 
combination of Pan-Arabism rhetoric, stronger diplomatic ties between Morocco and 
other Arab countries, and, periodically, the escalation of the tensions between Jews and 
Muslims in Israel and Palestine began to generate in many Moroccan Muslims a new 
sense of identification with the greater Arab world.  
Back in the earlier part of the century, as modern nationalism had just begun to 
develop in Morocco, Zionist ideas also entered the Jewish communities of Morocco, 
coming first through European lines of communication. Zionism became even more 
                                                        
106 Mitchell, “The Development of Nationalism in French Morocco,” 431. 
107 Pan-Arabism is the ideology that promotes the unification of all countries in the 
greater Arab world – North Africa and most of the Middle East. Though the idea of 
Arab unity emerged in the 1940s and gained popularity after Israel’s founding as a state, 
Pan-Arabism truly gained traction as an ideology under the leadership of Egyptian 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who governed Egypt (which under his governance was 
part of a short-lived political union with Syria known as the United Arab Republic).  
108 Elie A. Salem, Arab Nationalism: A Reappraisal, International Journal 17, No. 3 
(1962), 290.  
 50 
 
appealing to Moroccan Jews as Moroccan nationalism became increasingly associated 
with the Arab world and Islam, and as Moroccan Jews consequently became 
increasingly alienated from their Muslim countrymen.  
The Zionists’ primary goal, in Morocco and elsewhere, was to find a solution to 
the issues Jews faced as second-class citizens in most of the countries they inhabited. 
The French colonial government and its limbs, like the AIU, had a similar goal with an 
opposite strategy. The French sought to solve the issue by integrating Moroccan Jews 
into a transplanted French culture, Europeanizing them and training them to adopt a 
way of life with which they and their Muslim compatriots were unfamiliar. The 
Zionists, on the other hand, accused the AIU of “sacrificing Jewish goals in favor of 
national interests.”109 Their route to solving the issues that the Jewish diaspora faced 
was to physically uproot “the Jews from the diaspora and [to place] them in a homeland 
of their own.”110 Particularly after 1939, the contradictions between the goals of 
Zionists and the AIU created tension between the two groups who sought to influence 
Moroccan Jews in different ways.  
The AIU’s assimilation project was an obstacle to the Zionists’ goal, which was 
to make aliyah111 a viable and appealing option for Moroccan Jews.112 Likewise, the 
Zionist pursuits stood as direct obstacles to the AIU cause, as AIU delegate Yomtov 
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Sémach would vehemently argue. At first, however, most AIU representatives were 
unconcerned about the Zionists’ presence in Morocco. Even Sémach underestimated at 
first, “the attachment of the early political Zionists to their cause.”113 Due to the slow 
growth of the Zionists’ following in North Africa through the 1910s, Sémach and other 
AIU delegates doubted that it would be successful. By 1917, the year the Balfour 
Declaration114 was passed, however, some AIU leaders in Morocco began to recognize 
the potential that Zionist ideas might gain in in the near future as the movement gained 
traction. In particular, Henri Gaillard saw Zionism and pan-Arabism as the two most 
immediate dangers that would seriously threaten French reign over Morocco.115 He 
advised the AIU to prevent the rise of these two nationalisms in Morocco, and to guide 
Moroccan Jews “in the path of French civilization.”116 Ironically, it was the AIU’s 
relatively rigid structure and the shortcomings of its actions that would act as catalysts 
in the eventual rise of both movements. The Zionist activities continued to grow at a 
modest rate for a while, and did not wield great influence before 1939. Even at that 
time, though opposition was quiet, the AIU was not the only group that was against the 
Zionists’ presence – the French government and Moroccan citizens themselves were 
largely unimpressed by the rhetoric. Despite their lukewarm reception, however, the 
Zionist cells and their limited activities before 1939 in Morocco laid the groundwork for 
the expansion of their activities during and after the Second World War.                                                          
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By the 1930s, as Moroccan nationalism became stronger and increasingly 
associated with greater Arab unity, the AIU simultaneously began to pay closer 
attention to the Zionist movement. During those years, the interactions between the AIU 
and Zionists in Morocco became considerably more strained. The Secretary General of 
the AIU in Paris, Jacques Bigart, explained the AIU’s opposition to the Zionists’ agenda 
in 1934, asking on behalf of the AIU:  
are we, who for many years have fought to attract people to the emancipation of 
the Jews, able to support a movement which stands against our efforts? The 
process of emancipation, in our opinion, is the absolute adaptation of the Jew to 
his patrie nouvelle. Zionism with its dishonest characteristics condemns this 
adaptation.117  
 
As time went on, the AIU and the Zionists observed which tactics of the other 
group were most effective in convincing the Moroccan Jewish masses of the importance 
of their cause, and each sometimes borrowed and adapted the other’s tactics to meet 
their own ends. Particularly in the beginning of the 20th century, rather than providing 
educational and vocational training for Jews that would fit within the context of their 
socioeconomic position in Morocco, the AIU attempted to “Parisienize” the Jews, and 
only extended its efforts to certain urban areas in Morocco, many of a relatively high 
socioeconomic status. By helping the urban and wealthy Jews of Morocco to 
“assimilate” into the colonial French urban culture, and neglecting to engage Jews of 
less prestigious trades and of less urban lifestyles, the AIU both divided urban Jews 
from their own Moroccan culture and from other Jews of different socioeconomic 
backgrounds.  
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Furthermore, the Europeanized urban Jews in Morocco, trained by the French in 
white-collar trades, also only felt the economic benefits of their special training 
intermittently after the French Protectorate became established. The percentage of the 
Moroccan Jewish population employed in white-collar positions fluctuated depending 
on economic and political conditions both inside and outside of Morocco. By 1930, 
Moroccan Muslim nationalists had become semi-successful in demanding greater 
Muslim representation in administrative agencies, and while their numbers were still 
relatively low in administrative positions, Moroccan Muslims were given greater 
consideration for these roles than they had been before. Several other factors that 
emerged around this time – such as the 1930 economic crisis and the larger presence of 
French expats in administrative roles – began to diminish the Jews’ role in colonial 
administration as well.118 As a result, having been trained and actively recruited for 
these positions for decades under the auspices of the French government and the 
AIU,119 urban Jews had been culturally separated from and had faced the 
                                                        
118 In 1951, for instance, the census indicates that, while Muslim participation in 
administrative roles increased after the 1930s, Jews were still better represented overall 
in white-collar positions than Muslims for some decades. In the two administrative job 
categories that Laskier analyzes, 8.25% of Jews and 3.90% of Muslims, out of the total 
urban population employed that year in each category, held white-collar positions. In 
1960 the numbers increased again – though he acknowledges that the exact cause of this 
increase has not yet been analyzed, Laskier hypothesizes that it could be due to two 
separate factors: 1) the Moroccan government may have begun employing more Jews 
post-independence to give them incentive to stay in Morocco and not leave for France 
or Israel. This factor may have been independent of or in combination with 2) the need 
for trained personnel familiar with the European system to take over positions that were 
left vacant when the French left, but that were necessary in the administration of a 
country in transition. For more information and a more detailed analysis of the changing 
roles of Jews in the Protectorate urban elite workforce, see Laskier, The Alliance 
Israélite Universelle and the Jewish Communities of Morocco: 1862-1962, Chapter VII. 
119 While the AIU was the primary body of the French colonial power that trained Jews 
in these elite trades, the French government schools in the French zone of Morocco and 
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disillusionment of their Moroccan Muslim neighbors, because, in this particular case, 
they were the part of a minority community that had benefited from an unequal colonial 
situation. Partly because, overtime, elite Jews that had been trained for the white-collar 
positions were recruited in smaller numbers, training in other sectors became necessary 
to sustain the employment of urban upper-class Jews and their contributions to the 
Moroccan economy. While many urban Jews of lower socio-economic status in the 
mellahs had been at first neglected by the AIU’s pursuits, they had continued their 
engagement in certain traditional trades. When the AIU decided to expand the scope of 
its activities, it specifically targeted the urban and rural areas it had previously ignored 
in order to garner more support from a larger variety of Moroccan Jewish communities. 
Though this expansion came too late to have the impact it might otherwise have had on 
Morocco’s sociocultural dynamics, the scope of the Alliance’s activities in Morocco 
eventually exceeded, by far, the institution’s activities in any other country where it was 
present.120   
If the Alliance had from the beginning provided more opportunities for 
vocational or agricultural training, more Moroccan Jews from the hinterlands would 
have been included in the French educational endeavors in Morocco and would likely 
have felt less alienated and faced less difficulty finding employment as the economy 
modernized.121 On a small scale, the AIU had since the beginning of the Protectorate in 
                                                                                                                                                                  
in Tangier played a role in training Moroccan Jews to be journalists, teachers, 
pharmacists, lawyers, and physicians. See Laskier, The Alliance Israélite Universelle 
and the Jewish Communities of Morocco: 1862-1962, Chapter VII, for more 
information about the evolution of French employment training in urban Moroccan 
Jewish communities.  
120 Laskier, Alliance Israélite Universelle, 354.  
121 Laskier, Alliance Israélite Universelle, 255.  
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1912 supported vocational training and education. However, this training took the place 
in the form of small workshops in large cities. Urban Jews were, again, the main 
beneficiaries of these workshops, and the presence of these useful workshops in cities 
but not in the interior resulted in the migration of Moroccan Jews from rural to urban 
areas, a phenomenon that created visible economic competition between urban Muslims 
and Jews. From that point on, though the development of AIU vocational training 
developed very gradually, some AIU representatives began to acknowledge the need to 
expand opportunities within the AIU to combat unemployment if nothing else.122  
Though vocational training developed Nahum Sokolow, a Hebrew-language 
journalist and Zionist leader of the 20th century suggested that:  
Instead of attempting to transplant a Parisian boulevardier or a Parisian student 
in the Mediterranean-basin communities, agricultural (and perhaps vocational) 
training, modeled on the Mikveh Israel example123, would create a Jewish type 
of peasant who would be similar in many ways to a French small landholder. 
Instead of striving toward assimilation to French culture, the AIU, through 
agricultural training, would help create the type of Jewish peasant who would 
resemble the French peasants of Bretagne, Normandy, and the isle of Oberon; 
they would become economically independent, producing their own fruit, milk, 
butter, cheese, and flour to make bread.124  
 
This course of action would have assimilated rural Jews into a Europeanized 
lifestyle that would have also given them a socioeconomic standing and important 
vocational position similar to what many of them held in Morocco. The AIU 
acknowledged the need to diversify their activities and attract Moroccan Jews from a 
wider range of backgrounds. For several years, however, the AIU’s Central Committee 
                                                        
122 Laskier, Alliance Israélite Universelle, 255.  
123 Mikveh Israel (“Hope of Israel”) was founded in 1870, and is located in central 
Israel, near the city Tel Aviv. This agricultural boarding school was the first of its kind 
and was founded by Charles Netter, emissary to the AIU.  
124 Laskier, Alliance Israélite Universelle, 196.  
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feared that expanding too much into the agricultural sector, alongside proponents of 
Zionism, would only render the Zionist cause more effective as it would train Moroccan 
Jews in skills many of them would need to find jobs upon making aliyah. The AIU 
consequently neglected to establish more agricultural schools during the 1920s. Instead, 
the institution continued primarily to pursue ways of expanding elite education to Jews 
in the cities, and gradually developed programs in vocational training for lower-level 
trades.125 As the AIU’s activities in Moroccan cities developed and slowly spread into 
smaller towns, villages, and eventually, the hinterlands, most rural Jews were still left 
without the support of the colonialists, their Muslim countrymen, or the Jews of the 
urban upper classes.  
Therefore, France’s presence in Morocco paradoxically served to alienate Jews 
from the rest of Moroccan society in multiple ways–not only did it try to target Jews 
specifically through the rule of law, but, through institutions such as the Alliance 
Israélite Universelle, it also Europeanized a select number of urban Jewish families and 
youth in Morocco, while the rest remained in crowded mellahs. Essentially, French 
imperialism acted as a catalyst in the formation of gradual divisions between Jews and 
Muslims in Morocco.126 The distance between Moroccan Jews and Moroccan Muslims 
grew after World War II, specifically between 1944 and 1956. In 1947, UN Resolution 
181 was passed and in 1948, the State of Israel was formed. As a result, “from that point 
on, Moroccan nationalists would openly look askance at their Jewish compatriots,                                                         
125 Though the AIU’s vocational programs grew gradually at first, they expanded 
greatly after the Second World War. The AIU’s activities had been halted during World 
War II by the French Vichy regime, but the work they had laid down in Morocco before 
1939  
126 Interview with Professor Mohammed Hatmi, Bibliothèque Nationale, Rabat, 
Morocco. Conducted by Namratha Somayajula, 17 September 2015. 
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viewing them as Zionists first and Moroccans second.”127 Additionally, during the 
Moroccan movement towards independence, Moroccan Jews–as well as Moroccan 
Muslims who worked under French rule–were targeted for their affiliations with the 
French and their European ways of life.  
The feeling that Morocco was not their own country, in which they could be 
fully equal, increased for many Jews during and after World War II.128 Sultan 
Muhammad V approved the passing of certain anti-Jewish laws under the Vichy 
government in France, which would deny Jews of much of their rights in France and in 
overseas French colonial entities like Morocco. However, Muhammad V was the same 
Sultan who vehemently protected his Jewish subjects from the Nazis, refusing to make 
them wear the yellow stars prepared for them by the Vichy government.129 In this sense, 
the Sultan protected Jews from the harassment and potential harm that would inevitably 
have been inflicted on them by their fellow countrymen if they had been visually 
distinguished as “others,” during the 20th century just as they had been in the mellahs.    
The emigration of Jews from their homeland of Morocco accelerated between 
1948 and 1956, and Moroccan Jews made aliyah to Israel and migrated to France and 
North America. Particularly in the rural south of Morocco, the Zionists had proven to be 
effective in communicating their cause, particularly The French tolerated this pattern of 
rapid emigration until Morocco’s independence in 1956, when the new Moroccan 
government restricted it.130 In the beginning, therefore, the emigration was a clandestine 
                                                        
127 Ben-Layashi and Maddy-Weitzmann, “Myth, History, and Realpolitik,” 98. 
128 Interview with Professor Mohammed Hatmi, Bibliothèque Nationale, Rabat, 
Morocco. Conducted by Namratha Somayajula, 17 September 2015. 
129 Ben-Layashi and Maddy-Weitzmann, “Myth, History, and Realpolitik,” 97. 
130 Laskier, “Jewish Emigration from Morocco to Israel, 1949-56,” 323.  
 58 
 
activity and facilitated by the Israeli entity Mossad le’aliyah, which found the largest 
Middle Eastern Jewish populations in Moroccan and Yemen.131 The clandestine 
emigrations were carried out from Morocco to Oujda, where Moroccan Jews would take 
boats from Algeria to Palestine. In 1948, pogroms were organized against Jews in the 
border towns of Morocco and Algeria, but by the end of the year, the French 
government decided to work with “Jewish organizations…and find a suitable formula 
for legal or semi-legal emigration under French supervision.”132 However, clandestine 
immigration returned in the years immediately following Morocco’s independence, 
until 1961 when, due to the tragic drowning of 42 Moroccan Jews leaving Morocco 
secretly, the Moroccan government removed the obstacles previously in place to 
prevent Jewish emigration to Israel.  
Thus, emigration continued through the 1950s and ‘60’s, periodically increasing 
when political events in Israel and Palestine–such as the 1967 war–created apparent 
tensions between Muslim and Jewish members of Moroccan society. Asher Farhi, born 
in 1961 in Tangier, described his experiences with some Muslim children in his French 
elementary school after 1967. Every so often, he would be hit in the courtyard by 
Muslim Moroccan children in his school, who, though not fully aware of the politics 
behind the 1967 war, were nonetheless aware of the underlying tensions that 
periodically materialized between Muslims and Jews in Morocco.133  The Six-Day war 
was the turning point when he and other Moroccan Jews in his generation began to                                                         
131 Interview with Kati Roumani, Lazama Synagogue Marrakech. Conducted by 
Namratha Somayajula, 29 November 2015.  
132 Laskier, “Jewish Emigration from Morocco to Israel,” 326. 
133 KHOYA: les archives sonores du Maroc juif, interview with Asher Farhi. Conducted 
by Vanessa Paloma Elbaz, 2 March 2008. Accessed 17 November 2015. Name of 
interviewee changed for confidentiality.  
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notice a marked change in the way they were received as Jews in their country. When 
the Moroccan radio began to speak about how Israel had been “destroyed” after the Six-
Day war, Farhi’s family left Morocco and stayed in the Canary Islands with his uncle 
for two weeks, returning to Morocco… “after the hatred had subsided.”134 Eventually, 
his family moved to Toronto, and, in visits to Morocco, Farhi notes that, despite the fact 
that his family felt threatened in the years directly preceding their departure, Morocco 
still remains one of the only places in the Arab world where the older generation is 
welcoming of visiting Jews. His children do not have ties to Morocco yet, he said, but, 
particularly because Tangier’s history can enable Moroccan Jews to connect to their 
ancestry, he hopes to bring his children to Tangier once they are old enough to fully 
appreciate their family’s history in the city.135   
Like Farhi’s family, Moroccan Jews emigrated from Morocco in thousands 
throughout the latter half of the twentieth century. By 2009, only a few thousand Jews 
remained. Today, the pre-World War II Moroccan Jewish population of 215,000-
300,000 has dwindled to approximately 5,000, the majority living in Casablanca.136 
As Ben-Layashi and Maddy-Weitzman (2010) analyze the experiences of 
Jewish communities in Morocco, they remark that the immigration of Moroccan Jews to 
Israel has served to strengthen ties between Morocco and Israel. There were several 
reasons for this relationship and “King Hassan…eagerly played a visible role in                                                         
134 KHOYA: les archives sonores du Maroc juif interview with Asher Farhi. Conducted 
by Vanessa Paloma Elbaz, 2 March 2008. Accessed 17 November 2015. Name of 
interviewee changed for confidentiality. 
135 KHOYA: les archives sonores du Maroc juif interview with Asher Farhi. Conducted 
by Vanessa Paloma Elbaz, 2 March 2008. Accessed 17 November 2015. Name of 
interviewee changed for confidentiality. 
136 Interview with Kati Roumani, Lazama Synagogue Marrakech. Conducted by 
Namratha Somayajula, 29 November 2015. 
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facilitating the Arab-Israeli peace process, from the mid-1970s until his death in 
1999.”137 The role he played is reflected in civil society activism for peace in the 
present-day. Furthermore, his diligence in recognizing the Jewish history of Morocco 
has been carried on by his son, His Majesty King Muhammad VI. The 2011 
Constitution issued under his reign explicitly acknowledges the plurality of Moroccan 
national identity, “built on the convergence of its Arab-Islamic, Amazigh, and Saharan-
Hassani components…nurtured and enriched by African, Andalusian, Hebraic and 
Mediterranean constituents.”138  
Despite the fact that, specifically over the last half-century, relations between 
Jews and Muslims in Morocco have been characterized less by cooperation and 
understanding than they are by tension and stress, it is necessary to remember that the 
capacity to coexist is still very real. Coexistence between Moroccan Muslims and Jews 
is not solely a reality from the past. In fact, regardless of their departure from Morocco, 
many of the Jews who left are part of one of the very few diasporas that wants to keep 
its heritage alive, and retain its ties with its home country.139 Even in Morocco, 
cooperation between the Jewish and Muslim communities continues to exist, and 
relations are not solely characterized by the penetration of historical tensions. 
Cooperation exists and does not need to be re-created from the beginning. However, it 
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should be made more visible. Currently, the connections that once were are still there 
but are “just much more reduced…because there are fewer Jews.”140 
21st Century Civil Society: Re-Writing the Cultural Narrative 
Agriculture as a Tool for Peace 
Since their arrival in the region incorporating present-day Morocco, Moroccan 
Jews and Moroccan Muslims alike have been engaged alongside one another in the 
agricultural sector.  More significantly, the land and all that it has to offer has been 
shared between Muslims, Jews, and other cultural groups in Morocco for over 2,000 
years. However, the presence of Moroccan Jews in agricultural trades dwindled over the 
centuries. The AIU had provided agricultural and other vocational training to Moroccan 
Jews. Moroccan Jews were given training in agricultural work so that they would be 
able to “cultivate the land like their Muslim counterparts.”141 The first AIU agricultural 
training center was founded in 1936, in Marrakech. The objective was to encourage 
youth to consider agriculture a viable option for their future, and physically strong 
youth were recruited from the local primary school.142 Through a colonial ideology that 
sought, through the benefits of agricultural training, to ally the Moroccan Jews with the 
European settlers, these schools trained a significant number of Moroccan Jews and, 
due to the increasing presence of Europeans, enabled them to find work in the rural and 
urban spheres.143  
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 Based in Marrakech and founded in the year 2000, the High Atlas Foundation is 
a Moroccan-U.S. non-governmental organization that works with rural communities in 
Morocco to provide them with resources needed to carry out sustainable agricultural 
practices. It is within this framework of sustainable human development that the High 
Atlas Foundation recently pioneered a project known as “Maison de Vie,” or “House of 
Life,” in which partnerships were formed between the Jewish communities of the Al 
Haouz province and local Muslim farmers.144 Beginning in 2012, the High Atlas 
Foundation established plant nurseries on land lent for free to the Foundation by the 
Jewish community of Marrakesh-Essaouira. This land lies “adjacent to the tomb of 
Rabbi Raphael HaCohen, one of over 600 Jewish burial sites dotted across the country, 
in rural as well as urban areas.”145  
 Once developed, the organic fruit trees and medicinal plants in this nursery will 
benefit Moroccan Muslim farmers in the province and surrounding areas. The essence 
of the project denotes “life” in multiple ways. The name of the project was chosen 
specifically because “House of Life” is one of many traditional terms used to refer to 
Jewish cemeteries, and the term was fittingly employed by Governer Bathaoui  of the 
Al Haouz province during a ceremony in 2015.146  
Secondly, the trees themselves give economic life to the Muslim farmers who 
will benefit from the project in the coming years. Physically, the trees give life to the 
areas surrounding Jewish sacred sites as well as a sense that the land is being respected 
and used. The significance of this land use was noted upon the death of Moroccan                                                         
144 Kati Roumani, House of Life, (Morocco: High Atlas Foundation, 2015), 1.   
145 Ibid. 
146 Interview with Kati Roumani, Lazama Synagogue Marrakech. Conducted by 
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writer and professor Edmond Amram El Maleh. A self-defined Moroccan Jew–that is, 
not a Jewish Moroccan– El Maleh celebrated, in his own life and through his writings 
and actions, the symbiotic pluralism of Arabs, Jews, and Amazighi people in 
Morocco.147 Throughout his life, he was an activist who embraced his identity as a 
Moroccan Jew, noted the importance of Jewish culture in the historical and 
contemporary Moroccan cultural narratives, and advocated for the Palestinian cause by 
denouncing Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories. Before his death, he had 
requested to be buried in Essaouira’s old Jewish cemetery ‘among “all these graves 
which, exposed to the rank growth, the wind, and the ravages of the ocean, silently 
enclose the Hebrew inscriptions and mysterious symbols."’148 His burial was the first 
time in 40 years that the land in the cemetery had been used.149   
The use of the land surrounding the sacred sites in the Al Haouz province 
benefits the Jewish community of the province as it lends a very real sense that the land 
being respected and kept up, rather than receiving a threat of destruction or exclusive 
acquisition by the ‘other.’150 In this way, and in multiple other interpretations, the 
House of Life project allows the plant nurseries to serve as stages for cooperation, not 
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conflict, between Muslims and Jews in Morocco, rather than “trying to say where the 
boundary should lie between Arab and Jewish land.”151  
Cooperation on the basis of land use in Morocco, such as that occurring under 
the House of Life project, has important and symbolic implications. Kati Roumani 
describes House of Life as an “innovative agricultural initiative whose implications are 
broad and resonate acutely with current world events.” It is situated perfectly in 
Morocco, a cultural and political crossroads between multiple worlds, in which both 
Jews and Muslims have deep roots and where tensions have seeped every so often 
through the threads of an intricately woven social fabric. If adapted appropriately, “the 
model…created [by House of Life] could be replicated throughout North Africa, the 
Middle East, and beyond.”152 Already, the successful initiative the High Atlas 
Foundation has started expanding, and is projected to soon become a national initiative, 
expanding to communities such as Fez, Tangier, Casablanca, and areas around 
Marrakech like Ouarzazate, Azilal, and Essaouira.153 The goal in Marrakech’s 
surrounding provinces is to plant one million organic fruit seeds at Jewish sacred 
sites.154 
 At the beginning of the new decade, even before Morocco’s adoption of the 
2011 Constitution that officially acknowledged the country’s cultural plurality, the 
Moroccan government started leading efforts to preserve Jewish heritage in the region. 
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In part, this came from the Moroccan government’s commitment to fulfilling its role as 
a leading entity in countering extremism, and its tendency in recent years to globally 
define itself as such.155 To do so within its own country, the Moroccan government 
employed land use as a tool in cultural preservation, launching “preservation efforts” in 
2010 and restoring, in the past five years, “at least 167 Jewish burial sites,” and building 
perimeter walls around some of them.156  
 The House of Life efforts are an innovative and positive example of efforts to 
facilitate and make visible the willingness of Moroccan Muslims and Jews to cooperate 
in mutually beneficial initiatives.  In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as 
well as in the context of intercultural cooperation through agriculture in Morocco, “the 
symbolic power of these measures must be seen within the cultural framework of the 
participants, in terms of both the significance of the trees, and the meaning of land and 
the practices relating to it.”157 
 
Peace-Building Through Cultural Preservation and Awareness 
 
 One of the most significant leaders in the preservation of Moroccan Jewish 
heritage, the Museum of Moroccan Judaism in Casablanca, founded by Simon Levy and 
now curated by Zhour Rehihil, symbolizes an intersection between historical and 
contemporary Jewish culture in Morocco. Exhibits in two rooms display artifacts from 
ancient synagogues around Morocco, showcase the products of traditional Moroccan 
Jewish trades, and illustrate aspects of Moroccan Jewish culture through materials such                                                         
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as jewelry and clothing. In a separate room, pictures of synagogues around Morocco 
line the walls, accompanied by plaques describing each synagogue’s location and 
restoration date. Additionally, one room is allocated to temporary exhibits that, along 
with the others, seek to valorize and authenticate the rich history in Morocco of Judaism 
and Jewish culture. Now the museum is frequently the site of visits from tour groups 
and Moroccan schools that seek to expose their students to Morocco’s diverse cultural 
makeup.   
 In addition to increasing Moroccans’ awareness of Moroccan Jewish culture, 
and offering “an alternative view of Jews, it also offers an alternative view of Muslims” 
by ending a “pejorative image of Muslims…who are not tolerant,” and thereby bringing 
to light the capacity–and reality–of cooperation between the Moroccan Jewish and 
Muslim communities.158  
 Working toward a similar goal in a different way, KHOYA: les archives sonores 
du Maroc juif in Casablanca, led by Vanessa Paloma Elbaz, is a collection of oral 
histories recording the experiences of members of the Jewish community–and members 
of the Muslim community who lived alongside it. To avoid a flat portrayal of this 
profound history, the archive stores information collected from individuals over the 
years, the culmination of which brings to light connections and overlaps between the 
various stories. In this way, through tying together seemingly unconnected threads, Ms. 
Paloma Elbaz seeks to start putting together pieces of a three-dimensional puzzle 
through a sound archive that will eventually be available to everybody. The sound 
archive is a specific part of a larger research project, in which Ms. Paloma Elbaz has                                                         
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explored, over the past decade, the ways oral and written though work together to 
preserve traditions. She said to me, “the process of being a performer, and being a 
researcher, and of interviewing people” emphasizes that “you don’t tell the story with 
one little part of people’s experiences, but actually with all the different aspects of 
people’s experiences. That is how we can understand the complexity and the layered-
ness” of the full picture, and examine a history through different lenses.159  
As do many others involved in these efforts, she notes that, although there has 
not been a “break” in history in regard to cooperation between Moroccan Muslims and 
Jews, there is such a break developing in the younger generation.160 Through KHOYA, 
hidden voices can become accessible to young Moroccans who have never exchanged 
words with a Jew in their lives, living in places where the Jewish population that 
remains is minuscule, and that continues to grow smaller each year.161 The oral nature 
of the histories can preserve unique memories that are otherwise hard to come by. 
While “language exists in the world of boundaries and separation, sound exists in the 
world of emanation. So to marry languages and sound, we are marrying these two 
dimensions of ourselves–the world of identity, which is separation, and an aspect of                                                         
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humanity and…shared experiences.”162 This notion–of shared experiences and values 
across boundaries–is vital to communicate to today’s youth, who are growing up in a 
society that many believe is for the most part culturally homogenous.  
Communicating the reality of Morocco’s cultural plurality is one of main goals 
of Association Mimouna, now a non-governmental organization that was started as a 
student organization by El-Mehdi Boudra. As a Moroccan Muslim student at Al-
Akhawayne University in Ifrane–the same town where King Hassan II met with Shimon 
Peres in 1986–Mr. El-Mehdi noticed a gap in the discourse between his generation at 
the university and his grandmother’s generation back home, in discussing Muslim 
relations with Jews in Morocco. While his grandmother’s stories were characterized by 
anecdotes of friendly interactions and personal friendships, his generation’s stories were 
more abstract, theoretical, and rife with stereotypes. Mainly for this reason, he founded 
the Mimouna Club, which started as a student organization in Ifrane, but that has since 
spread to other universities in Rabat, Fez and Marrakech. Together, these different 
branches comprise the umbrella Association.163 The Association promotes Moroccan 
heritage through awareness of Jewish culture and history in the region. The members–
Muslim university students–address the obstacles that have prevented full 
understanding of Morocco’s cultural diversity throughout recent history.  
The rhetoric behind the organization’s objective is to promote “Moroccan” 
heritage through increasing understanding of Moroccan Jewish history, specifically 
because Jewish culture, like Muslim culture, has historically been an integral part of                                                         
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Moroccans’ social experiences. Association Mimouna reflects this reality through its 
name. “Mimouna” is a traditional Moroccan Jewish festival at the end of Passover 
during which Moroccan Muslims would traditionally take leavened foods to their 
Jewish neighbors’ houses to mark the end of Passover each year. Mr. El-Mehdi’s 
grandmother, like most Moroccan Muslims living in her area, participated each year in 
Mimouna festivities. True to his family and national heritage, Mr. El-Mehdi is “proud to 
be a Muslim by religion, Arab and Amazigh by ethnicity, and also Jewish by 
culture.”164 In saying so, Mr. El-Mehdi is acknowledging, specifically, the 
inseparability of Jewish culture from Moroccan culture overall, and reminding all those 
he speaks to that Jewish history in Moroccan played a foundational role in the 
development of Moroccan culture.  
In the beginning, it was difficult for the Mimouna Club to gain approval from 
the school administration, which saw the creation of such an organization as a “threat to 
national identity,” as well as from other students.165 Over the years, however, Mr. El-
Mehdi notes that he has seen small changes in attitudes from students in Al-Akhawayan 
University and on other campuses. While this is in large part due to Mimouna’s 
persistence and engagement with the campus community, it is also due to the efforts of 
prominent leaders in Moroccan society–such as Simon Levy and André Azoulay–who 
acted as bridges between Mimouna and the Jewish and Muslim communities in Ifrane 
and other cities. 
                                                        
164 Interview with El-Mehdi Boudra, Rabat. Conducted by Namratha Somayajula, 1 
December 2015.  
165 Boudra, 1 December 2015. 
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 Mimouna members, as well, have achieved a constant presence in student 
government offices, thereby convincing administration officials that their views do, in 
fact, coincide with those of a significant portion of the student body.166 The 
organization’s activities have been successful in bringing awareness of Jewish history to 
university campuses–in 2008, Al Akhawayan’s campus became “Jewish for a day.” In 
2011, Mimouna organized the Arab world’s first conference commemorating Jewish 
victims of the Holocaust and honoring Sultan Muhammad V’s protection of his Jewish 
subjects during World War II. Last year, in 2014, a Caravan of Moroccan Jewish 
heritage left from Ifrane, making stops in Ifrane, Fez, Casablanca, Tangier, Rabat, 
Essaouira, and New York. The organization’s activities continue and have received 
relatively little harsh criticism from outside sources. However, Mr. El-Mehdi notes that 
Mimouna is but one of several movements in Morocco that seek to either promote 
Jewish cultural heritage or encourage cooperation between Muslims and Jews in 
Morocco. These small bridges are each beneficial, but will collapse quickly on their 
own. He encourages cooperation not only between cultural communities, but also 
between initiatives advocating for this cooperation.  
Several of the people in both the Jewish and Muslim communities that I spoke to 
emphasized the importance of educating today’s youth in cultural pluralism. Jewish 
schools in Casablanca, which were originally under the Alliance Israélite Universelle, 
such as École Maïmonide, are secular full-day Jewish cultural schools that are attended 
in the greatest part by Muslim Moroccan students. Thus, such schools are naturally 
bridges between the Jewish and Muslim communities in Morocco and students are 
                                                        
166 Boudra, 1 December 2015.  
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made aware of other cultures within their society. However, schools like Maïmonide are 
an exception, as “Jewish history is not presented in school history books.”  
The subject of Judaism in Morocco remains, in some communities, taboo.167 By 
including information about Morocco’s full cultural history in textbooks and 
curriculum, schools can help break the culture of silence that surrounds such issues in 
contemporary Moroccan society.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
167 Kubes, “Moroccan Students Visit Arab World’s Only Jewish Museum,” 2011. 
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Conclusion 
 
The recent tensions between Jews and Muslims in Morocco, that result 
periodically in protests and small-scale violence, can be easily attributed to tensions in 
Israel and Palestine. However, historical material shows that government policies have 
sought to construct relations between Jews and Muslims in Morocco since the Middle 
Ages, as a way of dividing the Moroccan population and exerting control over it. 
Despite the external construction of their relations, however, Jews and Muslims in 
Morocco have displayed resilience in their willingness to cooperate, and, particularly as 
emigration from Morocco has increased, Muslims and Jews alike have displayed 
motivation to make Morocco’s diverse religious history known once more. From the 
movements and efforts I have highlighted in the above sections, it is evident that, 
despite the tensions that are manifested from time to time between Muslims and Jews in 
Morocco, the underlying willingness to cooperate as the communities did in the past has 
not gone away. However, the landscape of this cooperation has changed. No longer do 
Muslims and Jews cross paths multiple times per day as they did seventy years ago. 
Instead, the plurality of Morocco’s cultural history is becoming less apparent as more 
Jews leave Morocco. With fewer interactions between Muslims and Jews in Morocco, 
the word “Jew” is often automatically associated with “war” and “Israel.” Therefore, 
multiple movements in Morocco seek to correct this automatic association by reminding 
youth that Morocco itself has a colorful history of Jewish culture, and that a Jew in 
Morocco is just as Moroccan as his Muslim neighbor.  
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The Moroccan case lends insight into minority-majority relations in other 
contexts as well. Morocco’s history, and the interplay between policy and reality show 
the close correlation between government ideology and societal attitude. In Morocco, 
when governments harshly enforced laws that would separate Jews from the rest of 
Moroccan society, Jews experienced greater harm and harassment from other 
Moroccans, who did not see them as one of their own. However, in the present-day, 
when civil-society movements have the support of Morocco’s rewritten constitution and 
the country’s leaders, these movements have been able to gain slightly more traction 
that they would have been able to in the past. The history and the present-day reality of 
Jewish-Muslim relations in Morocco lends insight into the impact government policy 
has, long-term, on minority relations with a majority population, the dynamics that 
come with separation and segregation of populations, and the effects of assimilation 
nationalism on minority groups.   
 In Morocco today, though efforts to revitalize, on a larger scale, cooperation 
between Muslims and Jews sometimes entail negative or ambivalent reactions from 
either community, after such movements have carried out their activities for some time, 
the negative reactions are subdued, as an awareness of Moroccan Jewish culture 
increases. Furthermore, as efforts to facilitate cooperation are choreographed on stages 
that have, in recent years, become known as hosts to conflict–agriculture, for instance–
Morocco’s capacity to facilitate peace has increased. For future generations, it is only 
through an understanding of the mutual dependence and tolerance between Jews and 
Muslims that existed in Morocco for centuries – though there have been periods of 
discontentment and tension throughout–can youth appreciate the values they share with 
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those they perceive as the “other.” Along with movements and initiatives like those 
described above, “peace-building” must first begin with education and awareness. It is 
only when “children are first educated in respect-they must first learn how to respect 
differences between individuals–that a community be able to work towards peace.”168 
                                                        
168 Interview with Jacky Kadoch, Synagogue Beth-El, Marrakech, Morocco. Conducted 
by Namratha Somayajula, 27 November 2015. 
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Déclaration de consentement 
 
L’objectif d’étude  
 
D’apprendre des activités, mouvements, et organisations au Maroc qui dirige les efforts 
de faciliter le dialogue, la coopération, et la paix entre les juifs et les musulmans, en 
particulier dans la vie quotidienne.  
 
La durée et les éléments d’étude  
Cette étude sera dirigée pendant une période de trois semaines. L’étude inclura les 
observations et les interventions  des participants en incluant leur travail sur terrain.    
  
Les risques 
L'étude n'a aucun risque prévisible pour les participants. Cependant, si vous ne vous 
sentez pas confortable avec le procédé d'observation ou d'interview, vous êtes libre de 
terminer votre participation. 
 
Compensation 
La participation à cette étude ne sera pas compensée, financièrement ou autrement. 
Cependant, votre aide est considérablement appréciée par notre équipe de recherche. 
 
Confidentialité 
Tout effort de maintenir votre information personnelle confidentielle sera fait dans ce 
projet. Vos noms et toute autre information d'identification seront changés dans la 
description finale, et seulement connue à l équipe de recherche.  
 
Participation  
Je soussigné, ………………………………………….., confirme avoir  lu les rapports 
ci-dessus et compris que ma participation à cette étude est volontaire tout en ayant la 
liberté de retirer mon consentement à tout moment sans pénalité. 
 
________________________________    ___________ 
                       Signature                     Date 
 
J’ai pris conscience que cette étude puisse comporter les entrevues et/ou les 
observations qui peuvent être enregistrées et transcrites. 
 
________________________________    ___________ 
                       Signature                     Date 
 
 
Team de recherche  
 
Les chercheurs peuvent être contactés par E-mail ou téléphone pour n'importe quelle raison :  
E-mail : namratha@uoregon.edu Téléphone : 06 39 17 30 07/ +212 6 39 17 30 07 
 
 
76 
 
 
CONSENT FORM 
1. Brief description of the purpose of this study 
The purpose of this study is to learn about the activities and results of movements 
and institutions in Morocco that facilitate dialogue, cooperation, and peace-building 
efforts between Moroccan Jews and Moroccan Muslims. 
 
2. Rights Notice 
 
In an endeavor to uphold the ethical standards of all SIT ISP proposals, this study 
has been reviewed and approved by a Local Review Board or SIT Institutional 
Review Board. If at any time, you feel that you are at risk or exposed to 
unreasonable harm, you may terminate and stop the interview. Please take some 
time to carefully read the statements provided below. 
a. Privacy - all information you present in this interview may be recorded and 
safeguarded. If you do not want the information recorded, you need to let the 
interviewer know. 
 
b. Anonymity - all names in this study will be kept anonymous unless the 
participant chooses otherwise.  
 
c. Confidentiality - all names will remain completely confidential and fully 
protected by the interviewer. By signing below, you give the interviewer full 
responsibility to uphold this contract and its contents. The interviewer will 
also sign a copy of this contract and give it to the participant. 
 
 
       _________________________                              
_____________________________ 
Participant’s name printed                                       Participant’s signature and date                                                        
       _________________________                                 
_____________________________ 
Interviewer’s name printed                                       Interviewer’s signature and date   
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